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INTRODUCTION
Immigration law is a central justification for why five men remain detained
indefinitely at Guantánamo despite having writs of habeas approved in 2008. Since
then, the Court of Appeals in Kiyemba v. Obama I, II, and III has used plenary
powers reasoning to justify detentions. This reasoning defers immigration issues to
the political branches and denies rights protections because of alien status or
presence overseas. These five detainees are Uighurs, Turkic Muslims from China,
and are noncombatants. Their cases have raised significant constitutional habeas
issues, but use immigration law to justify detention.
This Article makes two arguments. First, immigration law—that is, plenary
powers and statutory law—provides a fallback justification for Guantánamo
detentions. Even though the Kiyemba decisions are viewed as habeas cases,
immigration law plays a central role in making detention legal. Second, a complex
political quagmire in the United States and in foreign affairs explains why political,
as opposed to judicial, solutions cannot free these men. The executive branch has
not used its parole power to release these men into the United States, thus
avoiding indefinite detention and separation of powers concerns. A transnational
analysis of the relevant political considerations highlights the influence of law’s
assumptions regarding alienage, culture, geopolitics, and the War on Terror.
Immigration law is playing a central role in justifying detentions on
Guantánamo, nine years after detentions began and after detainees have secured
three victories in the Supreme Court.1 In the Kiyemba v. Obama cases, immigration
law doctrine provided the legal basis for keeping five noncombatant men in
indefinite detention, even after a district court approved their writ of habeas in
2008. In these cases, immigration law appeared as a norm barring judicial review
for political questions and a rights limitation based on alien status or their location
outside domestic borders. These are hallmark norms of immigration law’s plenary
power doctrine. Court opinions refer to immigration law in the form of the
plenary power doctrine and statutory law. The Kiyemba cases concerned Uighurs
who are still unable to secure release from Guantánamo after nine years of
detention, though they have writs of habeas corpus and the executive has not
classified them as unlawful enemy combatants since 2008.2 Consequently, in all

1. Guantánamo detentions began in January of 2002. As of September 27, 2011, 171 men
remain detained. Seven hundred seventy-nine men were detained on Guantánamo during the nineyear period from 2002 to 2011, with the majority now released or relocated. See Andrei Scheinknan et
al., The Guantánamo Docket: Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees
(last visited Oct., 14, 2011). Judicial victories for detainees include: Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 733 (2008) (finding detainees have the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus),
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006) (holding military commissions created by the
executive to be unauthorized by law and inconsistent with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
the Geneva Conventions), and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480–84 (2004) (finding the federal habeas
corpus statute applies to the base).
2. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2008); In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litig.,
581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 35–37 (D.D.C. 2008).
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three Kiyemba v. Obama cases, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has rejected judicial remedies for these detainees. These remedies could
secure their release or enjoin their resettlement in China. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly denied certiorari review of Kiyemba appellate decisions, most recently in
April of 2011. The five Uighur detainees remain unable to secure their release
from Guantánamo—the appellate decisions bar their habeas release and use
immigration law to justify detention. These detentions are particularly significant
given Boumediene v. Bush, in which the Supreme Court found that detainees have
the right of constitutional habeas corpus, even as aliens held in an extraterritorial
location.
This Article analyzes the legal puzzle of ongoing Uighur detention in
Guantánamo, which is characterized by indefinite detention for noncombatants.
The legal puzzle is the result of a doctrinal clash between an extraterritorial
Constitution, with the Supreme Court protecting habeas for alien detainees in
Boumediene, and the plenary power doctrine which precludes most constitutional
protections for aliens. The Article makes two central arguments. First,
immigration law, mostly in the form of plenary power reasoning, provides a
fallback or default set of legal justifications to detain individuals in Guantánamo.
As the Kiyemba cases illustrate, after significant constitutional habeas protections
are afforded to detainees and their detention is found to be unlawful, immigration
law provides the political branches generous authority to continue detentions.
While much scholarly and public attention highlights the Kiyemba cases as settling
doctrinal habeas debates, these cases also clearly emphasize immigration law, in
statutory law and in the plenary power doctrine, as justifications for detention. By
repeatedly relying on immigration law, the Kiyemba cases stress how dependable
and secure this doctrine is to exclude aliens from constitutional rights protections.
For immigration and alienage issues, the doctrine precludes judicial remedies and
only permits political solutions exclusively from the executive or Congress. A
political remedy for the Uighur detainees appears extremely unlikely, given the
impasse created by China, U.S. domestic politics, and the detainees’ own choices.
The Article’s second argument is that Uighur detentions are facilitated by
assumptions in the law. The Article applies a transnational analysis to show not
only how Uighurs are victims of judicial and political indifference in the United
States, but also that their detention is facilitated by a critical context. From this
context, detention is the product of normative assumptions in diplomacy, culture,
geopolitics, individual rights, and the War on Terror. These assumptions facilitate
their detention, making both the legal and political solutions inoperative. An initial
version of this Article was presented on the symposium panel “Race and
Immigration Law.”
This Introduction provides a more detailed history of the three Kiyemba cases
involving the Uighur detainees, their ultimate resolutions in the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit, and their relation to habeas debates. In October of 2009, the
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Supreme Court granted certiorari appeals from these detainees in two cases, each
named Kiyemba v. Obama. Early in 2010, the Court remanded one case to the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, which then reinstated its prior decision after
incorporating new factual developments. For the other case it simply denied
certiorari without explanation. Both decisions effectively continued detention for
the Uighurs. The first case, referred to as Kiyemba I, considered whether courts
may order habeas release into the United States for base detainees when they
cannot be relocated home or to a third state.3 This decision was reinstated in
Kiyemba III.4 Kiyemba I and Kiyemba III addressed the same basic issues of habeas
release, potential release into the United States, and court-ordered releases. Kiyemba
II concerned whether detainees are entitled to notice of their habeas transfer, so
that they may contest their relocation to states that may torture or detain them.5
The D.C. Circuit held that habeas does not require this notice and that concerns
for judicial deference and international comity precluded judicial inquiry into the
executive’s relocation efforts. In 2010, a new petition for certiorari for Kiyemba III
was filed with the Supreme Court.6 On April 18, 2011, the Supreme Court denied
this petition.7 Justice Breyer, accompanied by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor, offered a statement emphasizing that the detainees do have
resettlement options and that the government is not imposing any obstacles to
their “timely release and appropriate settlement.”8
While all of the Kiyemba cases raised constitutional issues regarding common
law habeas,9 habeas remedies, and separation of powers, they demonstrate that
3. Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I ), 555 F.3d 1022, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct.
1235 (2010) (per curiam), reinstated on remand, 605 F.3d 1046, 1047–48 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011) (mem.).
4. Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba III ), 605 F.3d 1046, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Its appeal was filed
before the Supreme Court and docketed as number 10-775. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiyemba
v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 10-775) [hereinafter Kiyemba III Petition]; Lyle
Denniston, “Kiyemba III” Reaches Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 8, 2010, 4:22 PM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2010/12/kiyemba-iii-reaches-court.
5. See Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II ), 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1880 (2010) (mem.).
6. See Kiyemba III Petition, supra note 5; see also A Right Without a Remedy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2011, at A26 (arguing that the pending Kiyemba III certiorari petition raises issues of preserving judicial
power and that the Court of Appeals in Kiyemba I nullifies the Supreme Court’s holding in Boumediene
and judicial checks on arbitrary detentions).
7. Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011) (mem.).
8. Id.; see also Adam Liptak, Justices Decline to Hear Appeal from Chinese Detainees, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 2011, at A18; Warren Richey, Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Guantánamo Bay Detainee Case,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/0418/
Supreme-Court-refuses-to-hear-Guantanamo-Bay-detainee-case.
9. Many scholars have explored the habeas law implications of Kiyemba detentions. See Joseph
Pace, Suspending the Writ at Guantánamo: Take III?, 119 YALE L.J. 825 (2010) (arguing that legislation
requiring the executive to notify Congress of base detainee release or resettlement violates the
Constitution’s Suspension Clause); Caprice L. Roberts, Rights, Remedies, & Habeas Corpus—The Uighurs,
Legally Free While Actually Imprisoned, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2009); Caroline Wells Stanton, Rights and
Remedies: Meaningful Habeas Corpus in Guantanamo, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 891 (2010). There is also
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immigration law doctrine provides generous justification for detention even in
situations when noncombatants are detained indefinitely.10 In theory, if certiorari
were granted in any of the Kiyemba cases, the Supreme Court may provide the next
step in habeas doctrine since Boumediene v. Bush found constitutional habeas does
protect base detainees.11 In Boumediene the Supreme Court held that habeas
extends despite detainees’ noncitizen status and their presence outside domestic
borders. Accordingly, before the Kiyemba disputes in 2009, alienage and
extraterritorial location were not formal bars to constitutional rights or judicial
remedies. This Article argues that by relying on immigration law to justify
detentions, the Kiyemba triumvirate suggests immigration law provides courts a way
to minimize the effect of Boumediene: extraterritorial habeas for aliens is checked by
plenary powers reasoning regarding political questions, alien status, and their

considerable scholarly work on habeas developments since Boumediene. See Baher Azmy, Executive
Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 462 (2010)
(describing Boumediene as presenting a new separation of powers theory to increase judicial review and
to provide force to a new common law of habeas); Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution
After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 259–60 (2009) (arguing that Boumediene confirms
the “functional approach” to extraterritorial application of constitutional rights); Gerald L. Neuman,
The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause after Boumediene v. Bush, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 538 (2010)
(arguing that Boumediene affirms that the Suspension Clause guarantees some judicial review, for
citizens and noncitizens, against unlawful detention); Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the
Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s use of habeas in the War on
Terror cases represents questions about the role of courts in constitutional ordering); Stephen I.
Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2107, 2110 (2009) (emphasizing that Boumediene’s habeas approach is presented as a separation
of powers concern but it focuses on the geographic reach of habeas); Stephen I. Vladeck, The New
Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2011) (reviewing PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS:
FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010)) (describing how historical research of habeas for the 1502 to
1798 period shows separation of powers justifications for the writ and reasoning recent constitutional
habeas doctrine); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Unreviewable Executive: Kiyemba, Maqaleh, and the Obama
Administration, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 603 (2010) (arguing limits on judicial review, especially limits
on habeas, are really efforts to increase executive power, and also comparing Bush and Obama
approaches). For a description of these habeas proceeding developments, not limited to Uighur
detention, see Ernesto Hernández-López, Guantánamo as a “Legal Black Hole”: A Base for Expanding
Space, Markets, and Culture, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 141, 141–75 (2010).
10. This Article focuses primarily on alienage and immigration law relevant to base detentions
since Boumediene v. Bush was decided in 2008. The base, immigration, and constitutional law issues
were previously raised in the Haitian and Cuban refugee contexts in the early 1990s. See Haitian
Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1506 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding the constitutional right to
judicial review does not apply on the base); Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1236,
1326–29 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding constitutional claims for base detainees likely to succeed); Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1049 (E.D.N.Y 1993) (vacated by order to a settlement
agreement). The Bush Administration interpreted these cases as suggesting habeas did not apply to
the base for War on Terror detainees. See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S
ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 142–43 (2006). Although usually not reported, refugees
unrelated to the War on Terror still remain on the base. See Sonia R. Farber, Forgotten at Guantánamo:
The Boumediene Decision and Its Implications for Refugees at the Base under the Obama Administration, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 989, 997 (2010).
11. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 724 (2008).
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location. The Kiyemba cases suggest that the plenary powers doctrine, as applied to
aliens detained overseas, limits extraterritorial constitutional protections implied in
Boumediene.
The D.C. Circuit’s reasoning sanctioning detention reflects hallmark plenary
powers doctrine norms. The Supreme Court effectively agreed with this reasoning,
as evident in its denial of certiorari in Kiyemba III. These plenary powers doctrine
norms include: deference for political questions, the denial of certain rights to
aliens, and that an alien’s physical location precludes rights protection. Even if the
Supreme Court did actually rule in a Kiyemba dispute, it would most likely focus on
habeas and not limit the immigration law justifications in Court of Appeals’
opinions.12 Nevertheless, the doctrinal consistency of plenary powers effectively
has shaped the legal identity of these five Uighurs. They are aliens in overseas
detention.
Immigration law doctrine provides a fallback in the form of an established
set of legal tools to exclude foreign nationals, even after the Supreme Court found
that significant constitutional and extraterritorial checks apply to these
Guantánamo detentions.13 This fallback quality of immigration law now stands
out, after three Supreme Court cases since 2004 have checked the Guantánamo
detention program14 and detainees have won a majority of petitions for habeas
release since Boumediene.15 The Kiyemba detainees,16 Yusef Abbas, Hajiakbar

12. The Kiyemba III Petition overwhelmingly focused on habeas and judicial power issues
versus limiting or overturning plenary power determinations in immigration law. The legal question
presented was: “whether a judicial officer of the United States, having jurisdiction of the habeas
corpus petition of an alien transported by the Executive to an offshore prison and there held without
lawful basis, has any judicial power to direct the prisoner’s release.” Kiyemba III Petition, supra note 4,
at i. Sections iii–iv of the petition presented five reasons for granting the petition with four focused
on habeas, separation of powers, the Suspension clause, or judicial power and one focused on Fifth
Amendment due process rights.
13. See id. at 1 (arguing that the Court of Appeals reasoned that the detainee’s “alien status left
Article III courts powerless to direct a remedy”).
14. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 724; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding
military commissions initially created by the executive to be unauthorized by law); Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004) (holding alien detainees have statutory habeas rights).
15. So far detainees have won thirty-seven out of fifty-seven habeas cases. Twenty-four
petitions have been granted with the detainee released. Thirteen detainees have had their petition
granted but are still detained. Overall, 172 men are still detained at the base. Guantanamo Habeas
Scorecard, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/
2011-02-03%20Habeas%20SCORECARD%20Website%20Version.pdf.
16. This Article argues that the five Uighurs are detained because they cannot leave the base,
have restricted living arrangements there, and cannot move as freely as most base residents, especially
compared to those working for the U.S. Navy. The Uighur petitioners emphasize how it is not
accurate to rely on the Government’s view that they are “housed” on the base. See Reply to Brief in
Opposition, Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 10-775). The Government
contends that the five Uighurs who remain on the base are not detained, since they are not held at the
military detention center on the base, reside in a different location than “detainees,” and have received
resettlement offers. See Brief in Opposition, Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(No.10-775). Seventeen Uighurs, of the original twenty-two, accepted resettlement offers from Palau,
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Abdulghupur, Saidullah Khalik, Ahmed Mohamed, and Abdul Razak,17 share
similar identities with Chae Chan Ping,18 Ignatz Mezei,19 and Kestutis Zadvydas,20
the aliens in leading immigration cases. The detention or exclusion of these
noncitizens is primarily justified by the plenary powers doctrine, while
constitutional arguments in favor of release has proven ineffective. The plenary
powers doctrine has kept the Uighurs detained for nine years. By framing legal
issues, immigration law precludes habeas relief. The Uighurs’ detention is illegal,
but release is not required by law, even after nine years and habeas approval.21
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes relevant tenets of U.S.
immigration law doctrine used to justify Guantánamo detentions, which are
plenary deference limiting judicial review, rights exclusions based on alien status,
and similar exclusions because an alien is physically outside domestic borders. It
refers to these legal norms as “plenary power reasoning.” Part II presents how
opinions in Guantánamo cases incorporate this law. This section also presents the
executive’s power to parole aliens into the United States as an option to end base
detention for these men and avoid constitutional issues evident in habeas release
or immigration law. Part III explores the nonlegal forces that contribute to these
exclusionary pressures: insider/outsider dynamics of citizenship and alienage,
critical race approaches to base detainee nationalities, and the cultural and
geopolitical assumptions of the War on Terror. It proposes examining these forces
from transnational perspectives. This Article concludes by relating immigration
law’s exclusionary pressures with the nonlegal and transnational forces that
contribute to and feed off these pressures, particularly with regard to Uighurs and
the War on Terror.22
Switzerland, Bermuda, or Albania. For descriptions of why the five are not detained and the history of
resettlement options and writ of certiorari petitions, see Letter from Elena Kagan, U.S. Solicitor
General, to William K. Suter, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 19, 2010),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/SG-Kiyemba-letter-2-19-10.pdf.
17. Scheinkman et al., supra note 1; see also In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp.
2d 33, 35 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing reports that the “government provides these detainees special
housing . . . while efforts continue to resettle them in a foreign country”).
18. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
19. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
20. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001).
21. In theory, legal questions regarding detention may be resolved by doctrines other than
immigration law, such as due process, habeas corpus, or laws of war. This Article does not address
these doctrines.
22. This Article, and in particular Part III, is part of a larger project examining how
Guantánamo detention disputes reflect cultural assumptions in U.S. law on extraterritorial authority.
For examples of this postcolonial, historic and cultural approach to Guantánamo, see Ernesto
Hernández-López, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantánamo, Cuba: Does the “Empire Strike Back”?, 62 SMU
L. REV. 117 (2009) [hereinafter Hernández-López, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantánamo, Cuba];
Hernández-López, Guantánamo as a “Legal Black Hole,” supra note 9, at 141–214; Ernesto HernándezLópez, Guantánamo as Outside and Inside the U.S.: Why Is a Base a Legal Anomaly?, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 471 (2010). As empire expands geographically, the law of extraterritorial authority
becomes the conduit for contesting cultural and political values. See generally LAUREN BENTON, LAW
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I. THE EXCLUSIONS OF PLENARY POWERS
Limiting judicial review through justifications of implicit autonomy in
international sovereignty, the plenary power doctrine has been central to foreign
relations and immigration law doctrines since it was first developed in the Chinese
Exclusion Case in 1889.23 This doctrine has been a predictable, stable, and relatively
untouched set of legal norms permitting courts to be “hands-off” on migration
issues, thereby supporting executive and legislative immigration policies.24 It has
been used historically to exclude aliens, while it now serves as a way to preclude
Uighur release, despite their detention being unlawful. Importantly, the doctrine
allows the political branches to devise and enforce immigration policy with a sense
of security that there will not be many judicial checks.25 This autonomy, effective
in court holdings and in crafting policy, has been found to be settled law.26 When
the doctrine is used, courts may not review executive branch decisions regarding
how to interpret or enforce immigration law.27 At times, the Supreme Court and
courts in general have deviated from using the plenary power doctrine to resolve a
case and instead relied on statutory canons of interpretation to limit the doctrine’s

COLONIAL CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY, 1400–1900 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2002) (presenting litigation in imperial peripheries establishes legitimacy for empires with
examples from the Ottoman Empire, and the British in India, Africa, Oceania, and others); Lauren
Benton, Colonial Law and Cultural Difference: Jurisdictional Politics and the Formation of the Colonial State, 41
COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 563 (1999) (describing colonial jurisdictional disputes as shaping the
modern colonial state while simultaneously responding to boundary conflicts); Lauren Benton,
Constitutions and Empires, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 177 (2006) (presenting an “imperial turn” in sociolegal scholarship that examines the ambiguity of territorial status, construction of legal subjecthood,
and importance of imperial legal culture); Christina Duffy Burnett, “They say I am not an American . . .”: The
Noncitizen National and the Law of American Empire, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 659 (2009) (examining
jurisprudence on citizenship and alienage for the unincorporated territory of Puerto Rico as U.S.
empire grew after 1898).
23. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609 (finding international sovereignty as the source of the
federal government’s authority to regulate the entry and removal of migrants); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 722 (1987) (federal regulation of aliens).
24. Cf. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 510–21 (2003) (finding that Congress may make rules
for aliens that would be unacceptable to citizens). See also GABRIEL J. CHIN ET AL., IMMIGRATION
AND THE CONSTITUTION 25 (2000); KEVIN R. JOHNSON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION
LAW ¶ 3.B.1, at 102–05 (LexisNexis 2009) (describing the doctrine’s history, application in
jurisprudence and policy contexts, use in the War on Terror, and recent statutory limits); RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 5 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 22.2 (4th ed. 2010) (reporting that the Supreme Court describes Congress’s power
over admission of aliens as “absolute”).
25. See, e.g., Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed. Reg. 52,583,
52,585 (Aug. 12, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 214, 264) (referring to plenary power precedents to
answer inquiries about discrimination, as justification for executive immigration enforcement applied
to aliens of certain nationalities).
26. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 24, ¶ 3.B.1; GABRIEL J. CHIN ET AL., supra note 24;
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 24, § 22.2.
27. Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476, 480 (1893); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 706 (1893).
AND
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effect.28 But, these examples are isolated, typically focus on aliens inside the
United States and statutory holdings, or never really apply when national security
concerns are raised.29
To make sense of how these norms play out in legal disputes, Professor
Stephen Legomsky describes the doctrine’s main points. He identifies six legal
positions used to justify the doctrine’s normative position on judicial review: (1)
the constitutionality of immigration law is inherently a political question because it
is part of foreign affairs; (2) aliens are “guests” trying to assert a “privilege” as
opposed to “members” of the United States asserting a “right”; (3) it is unfair for
aliens to benefit from international law remedies and U.S. constitutional law; (4)
aliens have no allegiance to the United States and thus cannot enjoy full
constitutional protection; (5) the power to regulate immigration is inherent in
sovereignty and separate from constitutional limits; and (6) for exclusion
proceedings an alien has not yet entered the United States and thus constitutional
limits do not apply.30 Importantly, immigration law scholarship often focuses on
the issue of an alien’s territorial location.31
These six positions give weight to the legal reasoning that courts will not
review immigration issues, since the political branches have plenary authority over
them. Throughout U.S. history this position has been articulated in myriad ways.
Plenary powers have been justified as part of international sovereignty.32 The
United States’ international sovereignty is “necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is
28. See generally STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 242–43 (5th ed. 2009) (describing “cracks” in the doctrine that
developed over the past decades but how it is still utilized by courts).
29. For descriptions of how the statutory interpretation limitations on the plenary power
doctrine relate to foreign relations, see generally Ernesto Hernández-López, Sovereignty Migrates in U.S.
and Mexican Law: Transnational Influences in Plenary Power and Non-Intervention, 40 VAND. J. TRANS’L L.
1345 (2007) and Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 340–41
(2001). For discussions on how statutory holdings help evade the plenary power doctrine’s
exclusionary norms, see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990), Hiroshi Motomura, The
Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1625 (1992), Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984),
and Brian G. Slocum, Canons, the Plenary Power Doctrine and Immigration Law, 34 FL. ST. UNIV. L. REV.
364 (2007).
30. Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts,
22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 927–28 (1995).
31. Immigration law scholars often refer to these territorial issues as involving “entry” or
“border” analysis. See generally Linda Bosniak, A Basic Territorial Distinction, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407
(2002); Brian G. Slocum, The War on Terrorism and the Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution in
Immigration Law, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (2007).
32. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (stating that
plenary power, as applied to immigration, is not “expressly affirmed by the Constitution,” and is
sourced within “the law of nations”); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)
(citing EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. II, §§ 94, 100 (Joseph Chitty ed., T. & J.W.
Johnson & Co. 1876), and ROBERT PHILLIMORE, 1 COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW
ch. 10, § 220 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1985)).
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susceptible to no limitation not imposed by itself.”33 Because of this, immigration
and foreign relations issues belong to the political branches, specifically the
executive and Congress.34 In particular, many of the key plenary power cases
coincided with protracted foreign relations contests such as Chinese Exclusion or
the Cold War. These cases affirmed that a governmental power to exclude or
deport foreign nationals was separate from many checks in constitutional law.
Providing this autonomy for the political branches to treat migrants differently
than citizens, plenary power immigration cases reflect domestic anxieties regarding
foreign relations and immigration.35
The foundational plenary power cases, the Chinese Exclusion Case (1889),
Nishimura v. United States (1892), and Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893),36
excluded or deported Asians and Asian Americans with little regard for blatantly
discriminatory effects and racist reasoning. The policy was to use cultural and
economic justifications to exclude nonwhite migrants on the basis of race. The
plenary power doctrine facilitated this policy by providing policymakers and courts
with the ability to avoid constitutional limitations for noncitizens. The doctrine’s
genesis was very much a racially and culturally discriminatory effort of the U.S.
government.37 While its more recent applications in judicial opinions and policy
pronouncements often avoid explicit racist reasoning and appear racially neutral,
the doctrine still fosters racist and xenophobic forces in the law.38 This racist

33. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) (quoting Schooner Exch. v.
McFadden, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812)).
34. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (describing immigration issues as “committed
to the political branches,” either legislative or executive, because they implicate foreign relations and
political and economic matters); Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603 (stating that entry issues belong to
Congress and are not “open to controversy”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 712
(1893); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 853–54 (1987).
35. See Matthews, 426 U.S. at 81 (finding that the executive or legislature should have the
greatest authority and discretion over decisions involving foreign aliens because foreign nations may
be implicated); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952) (stating that immigration
issues are “intricately interwoven” with foreign relations, needed for “[republic] form of government”
and thus “largely immune from judicial inquiry”); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711–13 (stating that the
United States is a sovereign nation having the right to control foreign relations); Peter J. Spiro,
Globalization and the ( F oreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 704–05 (2002) (describing the
height of the Cold War and deference in immigration issues as evidence of “extreme judicial
deference”).
36. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 698; Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 651; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S.
at 581.
37. See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law
of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998), reprinted in 19 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 3 (1998); Leti
Volpp, “Obnoxious to Their Very Nature”: Asian Americans and Constitutional Citizenship, 8 ASIAN L.J. 71,
79 (2001) (originally published in 5 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 57 (2001)); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the
Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1592 (2002), reprinted in 23 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 561 (2002)
(arguing that national citizenship is not representative of identity and acceptance in the United States).
38. See Kevin R. Johnson, Minorities, Immigrant and Otherwise, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 77
(2008), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/constitutional-law/minorities,-
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impact and intent has not been overlooked by courts, which refer to the doctrine
as established by legal precedent despite these effects. Justice Frankfurter
explained: “whether immigration laws have been crude and cruel, whether they
have reflected xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, the
responsibility belongs to Congress.”39
In summation, the plenary power doctrine has a well-established and living
history of denying aliens the most basic constitutional rights in American law. This
protracted relevance predates the ongoing nearly decade-long Guantánamo
detentions. The doctrine’s utility in foreign relations, immigration affairs, and
extraterritorial authority has contributed to cultural and national security anxieties.
Its past corresponds with important social histories of U.S. foreign relations such
as Chinese Exclusion and the Cold War.40 The doctrine is still employed actively
by the government in its arguments in War on Terror litigation and in crafting
legislation.41 Scholars had argued that various Supreme Court decisions in 2001,42
including the Supreme Court’s finding in Zadvydas v. Davis that Congress’s
immigration authority is “subject to important constitutional limitations,”43
announced the plenary power doctrine’s demise.44 However, the doctrine has been
reinvigorated by political and judicial responses to the War on Terror.45
immigrant-and-otherwise (describing how the doctrine permits courts to limit substantive
constitutional protections for migrants and minorities in terms of equal protection and due process
rights); Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response to “Is There a Plenary
Power Doctrine?,” 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289 (2000) (examining the doctrine’s ongoing contribution to
de facto racist policies, including agency and legal interpretations of the Constitution and statutes);
Ediberto Román, The Citizenship Dialectic, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 557 (2006) (reporting how the
doctrine allows for the different treatment of nonwhite citizens and applying this framework to
nonwhite suspects in the context of the War on Terror); see also Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 597
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
39. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 597.
40. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 35, at, 704–5.
41. See generally JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 24, ¶ 3.B.1; Johnson, Minorities, supra note 38, at
77; see, e.g., Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed. Reg. at 52,585, supra note
28.
42. These also include INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 310–14 (2001) (affirming that
constitutional habeas corpus review of removal orders existed despite Congressional elimination of
judicial review) and Nguyen v. INS,. 533 U.S. 53, 96–97 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (declining
to apply plenary power reasoning to determine whether a person born outside the United States to
unwed parents, where the father was a U.S. citizen, is a U.S. citizen under the Immigration and
Nationality Act).
43. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001).
44. See Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2001). For
earlier predictions of the plenary power doctrine’s demise see Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power
Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law,
14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (1999); Cornelia T. L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of
Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1
(1999); Schuck, supra note 29.
45. For descriptions of this see JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 24, ¶ 3.B.1, at 103–05. See generally
NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION TO GUANTÁNAMO BAY (2007) (describing the
recent uses of the plenary power doctrine in response to the War on Terror).
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II. IMMIGRATION LAW: THE FALLBACK DOCTRINAL JUSTIFICATION FOR
GUANTÁNAMO DETENTIONS
Since the Supreme Court in Boumediene found that detainees’ alien status and
their physical location outside U.S. borders did not bar access to constitutional
habeas,46 judicial review of base detentions has continued on an anomalous path.
Suspending legal norms in a geographic area for reasons of political necessity, this
anomaly is historic since the United States first occupied Cuba in 1898 and leased
the base after 1903.47 Much of this anomaly has to do with practical hurdles or
substantive determinations of overseas adjudication. But independent of these
anomalies, immigration law provides stable doctrinal justifications to continue
detention, even in the prolonged and extreme cases of the Kiyemba detainees. For
the alien detained overseas, plenary power reasoning creates a doctrinal wall
between constitutional habeas and historic rights exclusions.
To explain how exclusionary assumptions in immigration law came to frame
Guantánamo habeas litigation six years after detentions began, and persisted for
years after that, this Section describes how judicial opinions refer to immigration
law. Mentioned in varying levels of detail in Boumediene, Kiyemba I, Kiyemba II, and
Kiyemba III, these issues include: political deference for noncitizen issues; territorial
and/or border reasoning to justify rights exclusions (i.e. aliens do not enjoy
constitutional rights, aliens do not have a right to enter the United States, or the
base is outside sovereign jurisdiction); immigration law statutes do not apply to the
base; and detainees need a nonimmigrant or immigrant basis to enter the United
States. An examination of these judicial opinions suggests that prodetention
opinions consistently refer to noncitizen exclusions with plenary reasoning, but
the relevance of this doctrine increased after the Supreme Court and district court
affirmed constitutional rights protections for aliens detained overseas. In short,
plenary power assumptions operate as a “fallback” set of norms to exclude

46. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008).
47. See JANA K. LIPMAN, GUANTÁNAMO: A WORKING-CLASS HISTORY BETWEEN EMPIRE
AND REVOLUTION 11–14 (2009) (describing the base’s anomalous quality and how it is separate and
distanced from the city of Guantánamo in Cuba); Hernández-López, Boumediene v. Bush and
Guantánamo, Cuba, supra note 22 (analyzing the base’s legal anomaly as historic, an intended result of
U.S. foreign policy since 1898, and influential in detention jurisprudence); Gerald L. Neuman,
Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1201, 1228–33 (1996) (defining legal anomaly and describing
its relevance to U.S. law and Guantánamo); Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantánamo Loophole, 50
LOY. L. REV. 1, 3–5, 42–44 (2004) (examining how Guantánamo’s designation as an anomalous zone
shapes the legality of War on Terror detentions). Aside from the anomaly examined in this Article,
detainees have recently faced a series of legal ambiguities in contesting their detention. These include
whether military commissions will be reinstituted, the executive’s detention authority requires a
preponderance of evidence standard to continue detention, hearsay evidence is permitted, and torture
or illegal interrogations make witness statements impermissible. See Hernández-López, supra note 9, at
199–207; Benjamin Wittes et al., The Emerging Law of Detention: The Guantanamo Habeas Cases as
Lawmaking (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo
_wittes_chesney/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.pdf.
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noncitizens, even when they enjoy constitutional habeas, are not combatants, and
have been in detention for nearly nine years. In situations like the Kiyemba cases,
when there are potentially dueling doctrinal approaches of extending habeas
release or relying on deference to the political branches, the utility of the plenary
power doctrine stands out. Here, the doctrine appears more applicable due to the
location of the detainees at an overseas base and the diplomatic difficulty of their
resettlement. The plenary power doctrine’s utility is triggered explicitly by political
resistance concerning the War on Terror and national security, and implicitly by
notions of the foreign national “Other,” feeding off fears of Muslims, Asians,
Chinese, or something other than Western, Christian, and democratic.48
A. Boumediene: Limits on Alien Status and Location as Bars to Constitutional Habeas
In Boumediene, the Court treated immigration issues—alien status, border and
territorial reasoning, and extraterritorial constitutional rights—as important to its
holding, but by no means were these issues critical aspects of its holding. The
decision was mostly framed as a separation-of-powers matter concerning an
unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus.49 The Court found the
Constitution’s Suspension Clause, including a constitutional privilege to the writ of
habeas corpus, does protect base detainees, despite their status as noncitizens and
their location outside domestic borders.50 It pronounced a constitutional basis for
its holding, finding the 2006 Military Commissions Act (MCA) and the 2005
Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) are inadequate substitutes for habeas, and thus
unconstitutional.51 It affirmed many doctrinal points regarding constitutional
habeas that have developed since the 2001 immigration law decision INS v. St.
Cyr.52 In the Boumediene opinions, immigration law and alienage issues stood out in
48. See Hernández-López, supra note 9, at 199–207 (providing critical race analysis of the War
on Terror’s cultural assumptions and base detainee nationalities). Detention trends are consistent with
discrimination in domestic War on Terror law and policies. For analysis of this discrimination see
Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CALIF.
L. REV. 1259, 1302 (2004), Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration
Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295,
298–99 (2002), Margaret Chon & Donna E. Arzt, Walking While Muslim, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 215, 218 (2005), Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the
Construction of Race Before and after September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002),and Leti
Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1577–82 (2002); Leti Volpp, The Culture of
Citizenship, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 571, 581–82 (2007).
49. See Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, supra note 9, at 966–70 (describing how the
Boumediene Court emphasizes separation of powers justifications).
50. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (referring to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
51. Id. at 771–96.
52. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (stating that the Suspension Clause protects the writ of
habeas corpus and includes, at a minimum, habeas corpus protections as they existed in 1789). Gerald
L. Neuman explains that these developments, which generally relate to the Suspension Clause,
implicate a mixture of rights protections and separation of powers, the Clause’s extraterritorial effect,
judicial power to order release, and a balancing test. See Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause
after Boumediene v. Bush, supra note 9, at 540–56.
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four ways: (1) how the majority initially presented the issue before the Court; (2)
how the court used a functional test to determine what constitutional provisions
have extraterritorial application; (3) how the court used the common-law history
of habeas; (4) and how the majority distinguished traditional plenary power
exclusions in prodetention reasoning to support its conclusions.53 The following
paragraphs explain the importance each of these factors plays in the Boumediene
decision and in the role immigration law plays in overseas detention issues.
First, the majority opinion, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, raised the
issue of aliens when presenting the question before the Court.54 It began by stating
that the petitioners are aliens, designated as enemy combatants, and detained at
the base.55 It noted detainees on the base also include aliens who are not
petitioners.56 In holding that petitioners have a habeas privilege, it stressed three
important immigration issues: that the question before the court involve aliens;57
that similarly situated detainees are aliens even if they are not petitioners; and that
aliens are the ones who ask for and are confirmed to have a constitutional
privilege.58 It framed the issues and answered the question in a manner that fully
incorporated detainees as aliens with access to habeas jurisdiction, despite their
noncitizen status.
The way the Court framed the issue as involving aliens and the suspension of
constitutional habeas became extremely important in its justification for its
holding. The Court presented the issue as one of suspending the Constitution, and
then alienage became a less important concern, and definitely not a bar. Even
though the matter involved aliens and aliens located overseas, Justice Kennedy
framed the debate as one of suspending the Constitution and separation of
powers.59 Meanwhile, the dissents focused on alien status as a bar to
extraterritorial habeas.60 Both dissenting opinions emphasized how for the first
time ever the Court was holding that aliens detained overseas enjoy constitutional

53. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732, 739, 747–48, 766–70.
54. Id. at 732.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 739 (asking whether the detainees’ statuses as enemy combatants and aliens or their
presence on an extraterritorial base precludes constitutional habeas protections); id. at 742–45
(presenting constitutional habeas as a separation of powers issue, reflected in the framers’ intent,
framers’ debates, habeas and immigration precedent, and recent War on Terror jurisprudence
(referring to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004))).
60. See id. at 803 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (finding that the political branches provide
adequate constitutional rights for aliens captured abroad); id. at 825–26 (emphasizing how the Court
affirms various rights to alien enemy combatants abroad and that these are “greater procedural
protections” ever afforded to enemy detainees citizens and aliens); id. at 834–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that alien status is a bar to habeas overseas, which was established in Eisentrager and The
Insular Cases).
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rights during times of war.61 This is contrary to substantial precedent.62 The Court
acknowledged that the holding was novel, but prior precedents did not offer “any
precise historical parallel.”63 For Guantánamo and the War on Terror, detention is
under executive order, the conflict’s duration makes it the longest in U.S. history,
and the United States is in complete control of the base even though technically
not sovereign.64 With a functional test emphasizing practical inquiries, alien status
becomes less of a bar to extend habeas overseas.
Second, when answering questions concerning the Constitution’s
extraterritorial application, the Court addressed issues about alien status and
presence inside and outside domestic borders.65 The Court reasoned that
constitutional authority over the base requires that base detentions be subject to
habeas proceedings, as long as those proceedings are not “impracticable and
anomalous.”66 Doing this, it avoided a bright-line or formal test for extraterritorial
constitutional questions. Such a test could focus on sovereignty, detainee location,
or alienage. Instead, the Court devised a functional test to determine which
constitutional provisions apply to this overseas location under American control.67
This test examines three factors: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee, and
the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made;
(2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and
(3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the detainee’s entitlement to the
writ.68
Importantly, this test decreases the importance of alien status when deciding
extraterritorial constitutional issues.69 The test mentions detainee “status,” which
refers to whether they are combatants or have been tried by a military tribunal.
The Court included citizenship and thus alienage as issues to be examined along
61. See id. at 826–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. See id. at 834–37, 841 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 770–71.
64. Id. at 771.
65. Id. at 756–61.
66. Id. at 759 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
67. Id. at 765–66. Gerald L. Neuman presents the holding in Boumediene as rejecting
“formalistic reliance” on factors such as nationality and location, and presenting functionalism as the
“standard methodology.” See Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution after Boumediene v. Bush, supra
note 9, at 261; see also Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After
Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2009) (arguing for a different extraterritorial test, initially
examining first if a constitutional guarantee applies and then how it may be enforced).
68. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. These concerns are procedural and substantive. The test could
be procedural if there was an executive determination or some process involving notice, ability to
contest, or legal representation. The test also substantively identifies the detainee’s citizenship and
combatant status.
69. Importantly, this functional test has been applied by a district court to detentions in
Afghanistan. Emphasizing nationality as a critical factor, the court found that non-Afghans brought
to Afghanistan to be detained did enjoy the privilege of habeas. In contrast, Afghans in detention in
Afghanistan did not enjoy habeas. See Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605
F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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with two other subparts, the detainee’s status as a combatant or noncombatant
and how this determination was made.70 Citizenship and alien status are part of
larger questions weighing additional concerns, such as the practical obstacles in
determining the detainee’s right to the writ.71
This functional test places less weight on alien status than does the Johnson v.
Eisentrager test for extraterritorial habeas.72 The government, dissenting opinions,
and prodetention judicial reasoning all use this older test.73 It begins with the
inquiry whether the detainee is an “enemy alien” and whether the detainee has
been in or resided in the United States.74 The Eisentrager test similarly references
factors to highlight a detainee’s physical location to preclude access to the writ.75
These factors include if the detainee was captured outside or imprisoned outside
the United States.76 Compared to the Boumediene test, the Eisentrager approach
frames the inquiry with factors that more easily exclude noncitizens by focusing
on alienage, location, and sovereignty.77
In addition to de-emphasizing alienage, the Boumediene functional test limited
the importance of territorial location as a bright-line factor. These indicia could
refer to de jure sovereignty or to the detainee being outside domestic borders.
Instead, the Court noted the United States has de facto sovereignty on the base,
because of complete control and jurisdiction.78 Citing the Insular Cases as
precedent, the Court held that the Constitution applies overseas on its own force
but that not all of its provisions extend.79 Following these precedents, Boumediene
noted that a significant factor for examination is whether habeas proceedings
would be practical.80 As such, alien status and de jure sovereignty are not
categorical bars. One of the Insular Cases, Balzac v. Porto Rico, found that
noncitizens enjoy fundamental constitutional rights.81 The Court referred to this
despite the fact that the United States lacks de jure sovereignty over
Guantánamo.82 The Boumediene Court explained that for all practical purposes the
70. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
71. See id.
72. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950).
73. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 828 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating how using the Eisentrager test,
the administration determined habeas did not extend to Guantánamo); see also id. at 834–43
(describing why the Eisentrager test is not a functional test, why it applies to Guantánamo detentions,
and how it is manipulated by the Boumediene majority).
74. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777.
75. Id. at 777–78 (referring to factors such as the alien’s residence in the United States; the site
where the alien was captured, tried, and convicted in a military commission outside the United States;
and the site where the alien was imprisoned).
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755.
79. Id. at 756–60.
80. See id. at 762–63, 769.
81. See id. at 758 (citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922)).
82. Id. at 753–55.
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United States has de facto sovereignty and that no other sovereign controls the
base at Guantánamo.83 It reasoned that neither Congress nor the executive has the
power to turn off the Constitution at the base.84
Instead of using bright-line tests, which would more likely exclude
noncitizens, the functional test prioritizes what is practical and possible.85 The
Court developed the test from precedents86 such as the Insular Cases,87 Reid v.
Covert,88 Eisentrager 89 (reading more into its approach than its holding), and Justice
Kennedy’s own concurrence in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.90 Although it
would not be practical to enforce all constitutional provisions abroad,91 this does
not preclude some extraterritorial constitutional protections extended to the base.
Third, in its extensive examination of common law habeas history, the
Boumediene Court found that potential immigration law limitations, such as alien
status and territorial reasoning, do not preclude habeas corpus on the base. It
referred to St. Cyr’s finding that constitutional habeas at a minimum includes
common law habeas from when the framers wrote the Constitution.92 It stressed
that foreign nationals, enemy aliens, and geographic concerns were not bars to
habeas jurisdiction in 1789.93 Many cases from colonial and English legal histories
highlight this.94 This history does not provide precedent entirely applicable to the
Guantánamo or War on Terror situations, but it is informative.
Fourth, siding with the Government’s defense of base detentions, dissenting
opinions referred to more traditional plenary power reasoning. Four justices
joined these opinions, namely Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and
Thomas, suggesting that the Boumediene holdings may have a limited long-term
effect, since later cases may check the broad findings on alien rights, habeas,
territorial reasoning, and extraterritorial rights. These dissenting opinions
proffered deferential reasoning for the political branches in foreign relations and
war, the political branches’ relevant expertise, the detention program as a political

83. See id. at 753–55.
84. See id. at 765.
85. See id. at 766–67, 770–71.
86. See id. at 758–62.
87. See, e.g., Balzac, 258 U.S. 298; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
88. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
89. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 763 (1950).
90. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277–78 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
91. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74–75 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
92. See id. at 746; see generally Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause after Boumediene v.
Bush, supra note 9, at 537.
93. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300–01 (2001)).
94. Id. at 747–48 (describing Sommersett’s Case, (1772) 20 How. St. Tr. 1, 80–82; Case of
Three Spanish Sailors, (1779) 96 Eng. Rep. 775 (C.P.), 2 Black. W. 1324; King v. Schiever, (1759) 97
Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B.) 765, 2 Burr. 765; and Du Castro’s Case, (1697) 92 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B.), Fort.
195).
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matter, and the significance of alien status and presence outside U.S. sovereignty.95
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion provided the most direct reference to plenary
powers. It began by highlighting that this is the first time alien enemies detained
abroad during war enjoy the writ of habeas.96 He explained that precedent justifies
alien rights exclusions. He explained how historically, whether in common law or
more recently, the writ does not extend to aliens abroad. The opinion argued that
the Court manipulates the Eisentrager test.97 He added that the Insular Cases are
different than Guantánamo, since the United States was and is sovereign in Puerto
Rico. Those cases along with Reid did not concern alien rights but spoke about
citizens’ rights instead; as such the Court was misapplying prior precedent.98 Chief
Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion emphasized procedural matters, especially
why the DTA is an adequate substitute for habeas. He noted that the Court was
striking down the most generous procedures ever afforded to aliens detained as
enemy combatants, that the DTA provides aliens more due process rights than
required for citizens, and that habeas is a flexible remedy and thus can be limited
for aliens.99 The Roberts dissent ended by summarizing what lawyers, detainees,
Congress, and the rule of law gain from the Court’s holding. Noting these
developments are bad, the dissent stated that alien detainees get increased
litigation and lawyers will shape alien detention policy.100
In sum, in Boumediene the Court found that aliens’s status and location are not
bars to extraterritorial constitutional rights protections. With this, alien detainees
may file habeas petitions to seek their release in district court in the District of
Columbia. It highlighted the length of detention and separation of powers
concerns, implicit in habeas as a check on arbitrary detentions and executive
power, as justifying these protections. Doctrinally, this was achieved by using a
functional test to determine what constitutional provisions have extraterritorial
application. This test minimized the relevance of alien status, albeit not fully
eliminating it, as a factor against constitutional rights protections. Common law
habeas history was not interpreted as barring aliens or nonsovereign locations
from habeas jurisdiction. The dissenting opinions highlighted the deference
implicit in plenary power reasoning and applied it to the specific facts of a War on
Terror and detentions in this war.
B. The Kiyemba Triumvirate: Immigration Law and the Fallback to Detain After Habeas
Despite the Court’s holding in Boumediene, the Kiyemba I and III cases suggest
that plenary power reasoning shapes the legal treatment of aliens detained

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See generally id.
Id. at 826–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 834.
See id. at 836.
See id. at 801–02 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 826.
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overseas. Here, plenary power reasoning permits the political branches to continue
detaining five men indefinitely and excludes courts from reviewing these policies
or ordering their release. The relevance of this doctrine, despite recent
constitutional and prior statutory limitations,101 contributes to persistent puzzles in
immigration law. The quick shift from rights-protection in Boumediene in 2008 to
rights-exclusion in Kiyemba the next year, facilitated easily and almost seamlessly
with plenary power reasoning, points to the doctrine’s fallback role in American
law’s treatment of foreign nationals. Historically, the United States has resorted to
limiting alien rights and using immigration law to create domestic anxieties when
faced with a national security crisis.102 To make sense of how an extraterritorial
Constitution fits in a plenary power world, this subsection first describes the
special factual circumstances of the legal quagmire for the five Uighur detainees,
the petitioners in all three Kiyemba cases. The subsection then highlights how
plenary power reasoning shapes the legal justifications for denying the release of
detainees into the United States, citing Kiyemba I from 2009 and Kiyemba III from
2010.
The Kiyemba detainees provide a complex set of factual issues regarding their
detention, their choice not to accept relocation options provided by the executive,
and China’s treatment of Uighurs and its counterterrorism policies.103 Twenty-two
Uighur detainees were brought to Guantánamo in July of 2002. They were
captured in Pakistan and suspected of receiving terrorism training at a Uighur
camp in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan.104 The U.S. military paid a
bounty to have them turned over. Since then, habeas proceedings have shown,
and the executive eventually agreed, that these men were not enemy combatants.
101. See, e.g., id. at 732 (finding that constitutional rights protections for alien detainees have
extraterritorial application); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 695 (2001) (finding indefinite detention of aliens illegal for statutory reasons and explicitly stating
that plenary power over immigration is “subject to important constitutional limitations”).
102. For a description of the historical process of sacrificing noncitizen rights for national
security in the United States, see David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 955, 959 (2002).
For a description of how War on Terror responses continue this, see Susan M. Akram & Kevin R.
Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and
Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 298–99 (2002).
103. For the facts described in this paragraph, see generally Roberts, supra note 9, Linda
Greenhouse, Saved by the Swiss, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR, Feb. 11, 2010, available at
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/saved-by-the-swiss/, and Letter from Elena
Kagan, supra note 16 (describing to the Supreme Court the history of Uighur detention on the base,
habeas litigation, and resettlement offers).
104. The precise nature of the location of these camps, how long the Uighurs were there, and
what training they received, if any, remains debated in legal pleadings and orders. This information is
invariably under government seal as confidential. Yet, the executive concedes that all of the Uighur
detainees are not unlawful enemy combatants and that the Parhat holding applies to all of them. See In
re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 35 (D.D.C. 2008). For the most developed
discussion of their reasons for leaving China, stay and training at a Uighur camp in Afghanistan, flight
from Afghanistan after the U.S. military campaign in October 2008, and capture in Pakistan in
December 2008, see Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 837–38, 843–44 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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They did not take up arms or have any plans to attack the United States or its
citizens. Seventeen Uighur detainees accepted resettlement options in Albania,
Bermuda, Palau, or Switzerland. In 2010, the remaining five received offers to
relocate in Palau or Switzerland. So far, they do not want to resettle there since
these locations cannot provide a Uighur community or needed medical services.
The government argues and the Court of Appeals seems convinced that the
remaining detainees can receive the same offers to resettle if they express such an
interest.105 Most of the issues remain confidential and under seal due to their
diplomatic sensitivity, but the Supreme Court’s recent denial of certiorari in
Kiyemba III suggests that the Court found that resettlement options, most likely to
Palau and to another undisclosed location, may be provided to the detainees if
they want them.106
China has exerted diplomatic pressure on countries to not provide
resettlement offers to the Uighurs.107 Palau on the other hand has no formal
relations with China and is heavily dependent on the United States for economic
aid and international security.108 This close relationship with the United States led
the small island nation to offer resettlement options to the Uighurs. After Palau
received twelve Uighurs in 2009, U.S. and Palau officials denied reports that the
island nation agreed to resettle them in return for increased U.S. economic aid.109
105. See Reply to Brief in Opposition at 3, Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(No. 10-775).
106. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011)
(mem.).
107. China wants the Uighurs returned to China. For descriptions of China’s position, see
generally Beijing Says 17 Released Guantánamo Uighurs Are Terrorists Who US Should Hand Back to China,
IRISH TIMES, June.12, 2009, at 12, available at 2009 WLNR 11246488; China Pressures Palau over Uighurs,
ABC ASIA PAC. NEWS (Jul. 19, 2011), http://abcasiapacificnews.com/stories/201107/3273013
.htm?desktop (reporting Palau’s President describes China is barring Chinese investment in Palau);
Frank Ching, Thorny Problem of the Guantanamo Uighurs, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 23, 2010, available at
2010 WLNR 2533760; Erik Eckholm, After 7 Years, Uighurs Go from Prison to Paradise, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., June 16, 2009, at 5, available at 2009 WLNR 11454127; Ritt Goldstein, Is China Spying on Uighurs
Abroad?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 14, 2009, at 9–10, available at 2009 WLNR 13395028; and
Carol Rosenberg, Guantánamo Bay Prison Camps: Swiss to Take 2 Uighur Detainees, MIA. HER., Feb. 4,
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 2301555.
108. See EDIBERTO ROMÁN, OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES 237–44 (2006) (analyzing current
dependence in economic, legal, and foreign relations terms between U.S. territorial possessions in the
Pacific Ocean including Palau, a Free Associated State, and the United States); see also Bernadette
Carreon, Uighur Refugees Plead to Leave Pacific Island, AFP HOSTED BY GOOGLE NEWS (June 14, 2010)
(discussing that these resettlement offers have not been favorably received by the Uighurs),
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iz5PF3FdBzhDua1GoRn6lYV5haFQ;
Sam Strangeways, UK Will Not Issue Passports to the Uighur Four—Gozney, ROYAL GAZETTE ONLINE
(June 11, 2010, 12:01 AM, last updated Feb. 11, 2001, 8:27 AM), http://www.royalgazette.com/
article/20100611/NEWS/306119920.
109. See Mark Landler, Palau Agrees to Take Chinese Detainees, Helping Obama’s Guantánamo Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, at A6 (describing that Palau has relations with Taiwan and not China and
benefits from long-term development aid from the U.S.); see also Julian E. Barnes, Palau Deal May Not
End Uighur Issue: The Island Nation Has Tentatively Agreed to Take 17 Guantánamo Detainees, but the Stay
May Be Temporary, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2009, at A16 (presenting arguments that recent negotiations
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As described in Part III, a variety of nonlegal issues explain why the current
Kiyemba impasse continues. Regarding the legal treatment aliens receive, these
issues point to important lessons on the nonlegal and transnational importance of
foreign relations. Similarly, these factual developments point to implicit goals: to
protect the five Uighurs from torture and prosecution in China or elsewhere and
to attain their consent for any resettlement. Viewed from the perspective of
protecting individual rights, these are positive steps, better than a forced return,
but not as good as a secured judicial release into the United States. A release
would not be as confined as the present situation of being on a small part of a
base with no ability to leave it. These facts continue to develop with their public
disclosure subject to significant diplomatic and national security controls. Perhaps
as the Knauff and Mezei immigration cases from the Cold War era suggest,
disclosure of all the facts may require historical distance and archival access.110
Charles Weisselberg has shown that political solutions for Knauff and Mezei,
permitting their presence in the United States, were actually quite different than
the plenary power holdings in their Supreme Court cases.111 These cases found
that judicial inquiry into the justifications for exclusion were precluded. Congress
and the executive instead worked to let them enter and remain in the United
States.
1. Kiyemba I: Immigration Law Trumps Habeas and Justifies Indefinite Detention
Despite this nonlegal context, the ease with which the plenary power is
applied to Uighur detention illuminates a great deal about how U.S. law treats
aliens. This begins with the Court of Appeals overturning a district court finding
that the Uighur detainees were unlawfully held on the base.112 On February 18,
2009, in Kiyemba I the Court of Appeals decided in favor of the government’s
appeal of a district court order to release the detainees into the United States. In
an opinion written by Judge Randolph and joined by Judge Henderson, the court
found that habeas does not require a detainee be released into the United States.
In addition, the opinion held that the judiciary cannot second-guess or review
political questions regarding diplomatic efforts to resettle them or their entry into
the United States.113 To justify why these are political questions and why rights
should be excluded, the opinion relied heavily on plenary power precedents. Its
interpretation of the doctrine provided myriad justifications for why foreigners are
between Palau and the United States regarding its 1994 compact of association and $200 million aid
from the United States motivated the Uighur resettlement negotiations).
110. Cf. Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of
Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1995).
111. Id.
112. Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I ) , 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The district court
opinion is In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008).
113. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1029 (holding that the judiciary does not have the power to
intervene when the executive is continuing efforts to resettle the detainees).

Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete)

214

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

4/17/2012 1:22 PM

[Vol. 2:193

treated differently by U.S. law and why judicial review of these decisions is
prohibited. In this opinion, the doctrinal wall between an alien’s constitutional
rights and plenary power exclusions appears as a necessary outgrowth from
international law’s history since antiquity and Chinese Exclusion.
Kiyemba I referred to plenary powers and immigration law in three general
ways: justifications for political deference in constitutional and international law;
territorial reasoning to justify rights exclusions, relevant to aliens and the base; and
statutory bars in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to detainee release
into the United States, in terms of their inadmissibility and a required visa basis for
entry. These three findings in immigration law sustain the justification that a court
cannot order a habeas release into the United States. Viewed in doctrinal terms,
plenary deference, territorial reasoning, and statutory bars shape the way
immigration law contributes to the legal decision not to release the detainees. The
plenary power doctrine exerts a normative influence in these three ways, despite
the detainees’ writ of habeas being approved by a district court and the executive
no longer classifying them as enemy combatants. Put simply, courts have
previously found that their detention is illegal and the Government does not have
a basis to detain them. Despite these reasons to release them, the Kiyemba cases
found that Congress’s and the executive’s plenary power over immigration justifies
their detention, even if detention is indefinite. These cases made these findings
after some significant factual developments: among other things, the executive has
worked hard to relocate these detainees,114 it does not want to send them to China
out of fear for their detention and torture,115 and it is unable to find a suitable
location for these relocations due to China’s diplomatic pressure and the detainees
rejecting offers.116
First, the Kiyemba I opinion drew a clear doctrinal link between international
law’s ancient history and the court’s present choice not to review the Obama
administration’s policy to keep the Uighur detainees on the base. This deference is
a product of a nation-state’s right to exclude or admit foreigners. This sovereign
right was recognized in Roman times and by the Constitutional Convention, and
remains an “important postulate” in international law.117 It is part of U.S. law,
necessary for international relations and for defense from foreign
encroachments.118 Sixteen case precedents from 1889 to 2003 support the idea
that “without exception” it is “the exclusive power of the political branches to
decide which aliens may, and which aliens may not, enter the United States and on
what terms.”119 This power represents a “whole volume” of history and precludes

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba III ), 605 F.3d 1046, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1024.
Kiyemba III, 605 F.3d at 1049.
Id. at 1025.
Id.
Id. at 1025–26.
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any judicial review, unless it is expressly authorized by law. Here, the Kiyemba I
court concluded, the executive has “determined not to allow them to enter.”120
Second, emphasizing the territorial location of the detainees and the base,
the Kiyemba I opinion examined what rights aliens have while detained overseas. It
noted that the district court did not specify what statute or treaty authorizes an
order to enter the United States, and instead only mentioned the Constitution
generally.121 Deducing that the district court referred to the Due Process Clause in
the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, the Kiyemba I opinion highlighted that aliens
do not possess due process rights without property or presence in the United
States.122 Congress determined in the INA and the DTA that Guantánamo is not
part of U.S. sovereign territory.123 The district court reasoned that detainee release
is required under the maxim of “where there is a right, there is a remedy.”124 The
Court of Appeals discounted this reasoning since statutory and constitutional law
suggest the contrary—that there is no basis for alien detainees to enter the United
States. For aliens, entering the United States is a privilege and not a right.125 The
terms of this privilege are political and thus cannot be reviewed by the judiciary.126
When reviewing whether the detainees have a right to enter the United States, the
court’s reasoning focused on territorial location and political questions and
discounts rights claims. This reflects hallmark plenary power reasoning. This
occurs even though the district court found detention was illegal when it approved
their habeas petition, and in Boumediene the Supreme Court reasoned that the lack
of U.S. sovereignty did not bar habeas rights protections on the base.127
To emphasize that its conclusions reflect established plenary power
reasoning, the Kiyemba I court discussed three important Supreme Court
immigration law decisions: Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei (1953), Zadvydas v.
Davis (2001), and Clark v. Martinez (2005).128 The Court of Appeals capitalized on
the location of the detainees to rely on the plenary power doctrine’s emphasis on
whether an alien has entered the United States. Focusing on the normative

120. Id. at 1026.
121. Id.
122. Id. (holding that district court language “suggests the court may have had [due process] in
mind”).
123. Id. at 1026 n.9 (stating that Congress has determined the base is not part of “sovereign
territory” of the United States and citing the Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(g), 119 Stat. 2743, and
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 § USC 1101(a)(38)). But see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,
755 (2008) (stating that it is an “obvious and uncontested fact” that the U.S. “maintains de facto
sovereignty over this territory . . . by virtue of its complete jurisdiction and control over” it); Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 446, 487 (2004) (Kennedy, J. concurring) (finding that the base is in “every practical
respect a United States territory” and referring to its “unchallenged and indefinite control”).
124. Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I), 555 F.3d 1022, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1026–27.
127. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753–54.
128. See Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1027–28.
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significance of location for immigration law, the cases all concern aliens in
indefinite detention, with Mezei affirming detention power and Zadvydas and Clark
finding that detention is illegal.129 Mezei is presented as most analogous to the
Uighur detainees, with common traits of: an alien at the border seeking entry, no
third country to receive the alien, a finding that the alien was not deprived of a
constitutional right despite the potential of indefinite detention, and a finding that
the judiciary could not question the Attorney General’s judgment not to release
the alien into the United States.130 Comparing these prior cases with the current
facts, the Court noted an alien’s location outside the U.S. border sustains
determinations that aliens do not have constitutional rights and that executive
judgment cannot be questioned. Focusing on location, alien status, and political
deference, these findings reflect classic plenary power justifications. Zadvydas and
Clark are distinguished since in those cases the alien had already entered the
United States, with the Court noting that “constitutional protections available to
persons inside” are “unavailable to aliens outside our geographic borders.131 Plus,
both holdings relied on statutory versus constitutional interpretations.
Third, in Kiyemba I the court stressed statutory reasoning in immigration law.
It found that there is no statutory basis in the INA to order or permit the
detainees to enter the United States.132 Habeas does not qualify as a reason to
enter.133 In other words, because immigration issues belong to the political
branches, to enter the United States, aliens must look to a statutory basis provided
by Congress or to executive efforts. Because the Kiyemba detainees do not fit
within this framework they cannot enter.134 The Kiyemba I opinion noted that the
Uighur detainees do not have a basis to enter under such categories as permanent
residents, nonimmigrants, refugees, or parolees.135 They have not applied for
admission pursuant to immigration laws.136 Like a primer for family- or
employment-based visas, the Kiyemba I opinion neatly presented these categories
and statutory references in the INA.137 It then stated procedural requirements for
entry or numerical limitations, which bar entry for the detainees.138 Said simply,
129. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001);
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
130. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1027.
131. See id. at 1028 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693).
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 1030–31.
136. Id. at 1031.
137. Id. at 1030–31 (describing family-sponsored immigrants, employment-based immigrants,
and the tiers of preferences for employment-based immigrant categories); id. at 1030 n.15 (describing
classes of nonimmigrants in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) such as career diplomats, temporary visitors for
business or pleasure, aliens in transit, ship or airplane crew members, students, temporary workers,
aliens with extraordinary abilities, entertainers and athletes, religious workers, and informants for
terrorist organizations or for criminal investigations).
138. Id. at 1031.
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the court suggested that the detainees apply for visas like any other foreign
nationals trying to enter.139 It even noted that the Attorney General has the
discretion to find detainees inadmissible as terrorists, and these grounds for
exclusion cannot be waived for refugees seeking asylum.140 The court suggested
that even if the Uighurs cannot be legally detained as combatants their alleged
relation to “terrorist activity” may pose a bar to entry. A court cannot review this
bar and the executive cannot waive it.141 However, this only applies to aliens
seeking entry as refugees,142 which the detainees are not. Moreover these grounds
for being inadmissible, codified as INA section 212(a)(3)(B),143 require far more
proof than has been suggested by the Court of Appeals. The Parhat decision and
executive classifications since then have found that all the Uighur detainees are
not combatants.144 Unless these facts are distinct enough to warrant a 212(a)(3)(B)
finding, the court may be premature in suggesting these as grounds not to let them
enter the United States.145 In particular, in order to find aliens inadmissible
because of terrorist activities, it is required that they “engage” or are “likely” to
engage in terrorism, have the intention to cause death or bodily harm, are a
member of a terrorist group, endorse terrorist activity, or received military training
from a terrorist organization.146 These must be associated with a specific terrorist
activity or a terrorist organization.147
The Court added that the executive has the power to parole aliens into the

139. See id. at 1030 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B), which mandates certain nonimmigrants
apply for visas, even for temporary admission).
140. Id. at 1031 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3)).
141. Id. (noting 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3) “specifically prohibits waiver of the terrorist ground”).
142. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3) (2006). Section 1157(c)(3) addresses which bars to entry the
Attorney General may and may not waive, but only regarding “[a]dmission by Attorney General of
refugees.” 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c) [emphasis added].
143. 8 U.S.C. § 212(a)(3)(B) (2006) (codification of Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 212(a)(3)(B)).
144. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1024 (noting that after removing Parhat’s classification as an
enemy combatant, “[t]he government saw no material differences in its evidence against the other
Uighurs, and therefore decided that none of the [Kiyemba I] petitioners should be detained as enemy
combatants.”); Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that the government
presented insufficient evidence to classify Parhat as an enemy combatant on the basis of his
involvement in Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement).
145. Increasing terrorism-related grounds for inadmissibility and their impact on asylum
petitions have been criticized as inconsistent with the humanitarian purpose of refugee law. See
generally Susan Benesch & Devon Chaffee, The Ever-Expanding Material Support Bar: An Unjust Obstacle
for Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 83 INTERPRETER RELEASES 465 (2006); Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo,
Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the Real ID Act Is a False Promise, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101 (2006).
146. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I–IX) (2006) (describing the nine grounds for inadmissibility
based on terrorist activities); see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 28, at 443 (summarizing
these grounds for inadmissibility).
147. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006) (defining and summarizing “terrorist activity”);
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2006) (defining “terrorist organization”).
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United States; however, this requires an alien already be applying for admission.148
Here, the detainees have not applied. Ultimately, aliens are not eligible for
admission unless they have applied, and even then numeric limits and other
considerations may make them ineligible. Interestingly, common law habeas
before 1789, which is what courts look to since the St. Cyr decision, supports
habeas to bring detainees to the United States.149 Steven Vladeck argues that this
common law history of habeas should provide a basis to release the Uighurs.150
Judge Rogers provided a separate opinion concurring in the judgment but
disagreeing with the court’s habeas analysis. She noted that the district court erred
in ordering release without hearing from the executive as to whether there was an
alternative basis for detention.151 Rogers’s opinion disagreed with the court’s
plenary power analysis and proposed an approach presented as more consistent
with Boumediene’s protection of extraterritorial habeas. The court’s decision in
Kiyemba I was not faithful to the Boumediene holding and compromised habeas as a
check on arbitrary detention and the balance of powers in exclusion and
admission of aliens.152 Judge Rogers’s opinion noted that the executive offered no
reason to justify detention, and therefore the immigration law justifications should
have been assessed by the district court.153 Zadvydas, Clark, and Mezei stand for the
proposition that there must be statutory or Congressional justification to detain
aliens. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court suggested that the plenary power was
“subject to important constitutional limitations” which could be reviewed by the
judiciary after it looked to a statutory basis to detain, expressing the political
branches’ immigration authority.154 In Mezei, Congress had specifically authorized
the power to detain.155 Here in Kiyemba I, detainees had a writ of habeas approved
and there was no basis to detain them. Judge Rogers presented this as unfaithful to
Boumediene and inconsistent with separation of powers. Similarly, the court’s
decision is inconsistent with Boumediene’s rejection of a territorial rationale to bar
habeas at Guantánamo.156
Judge Rogers’s opinion pinpointed the doctrinal conflict posed by Boumediene
and the ongoing detention of the Uighurs. It stated that Kiyemba I’s reasoning
tends to conflate the power of the executive to classify an alien as “admitted”
within the meaning of immigration statutes and the power of a habeas court to
148. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1031 (“The parole remedy, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) . . . is
specifically limited to ‘any alien applying for admission.’”).
149. See Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, supra note 9, at 972 (describing how historic
habeas practice focused on equity and bringing the prisoner before the court, suggesting remedies
sought by Kiyemba detainees are similar to historic practice).
150. See id.
151. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1032 (Rogers, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 1032.
153. Id. at 1033.
154. See id. at 1034 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001)).
155. Id. at 1036.
156. See id. at 1038.
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allow an alien physically in the country.157 This is inconsistent with the writ’s
history of requiring release. This debate between the dueling views on habeas
would have served as the main issue for any Supreme Court review in Kiyemba III,
had certiorari been granted in that case. Detainees developed this argument along
three lines. First, they argued that the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied
immigration law, which bars their entry, to a habeas release issue.158 Second, they
claimed that habeas release and the Suspension Clause trump the political
branches’ immigration authority.159 Therefore, they are entitled to release from the
base since they are held unlawfully and the executive took them to Guantánamo.
The Supreme Court has prioritized the right of release, even for undocumented
aliens. This right of release trumps the immigration powers of the political
branches.160
After initially granting certiorari review, on March 1, 2010, the Supreme
Court vacated the Kiyemba I judgment and remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals to determine if further proceedings were needed for the disposition of the
case.161 This occurred after all Uighur detainees had received or accepted offers to
resettle. When the Court granted certiorari review the legal issue was whether a
federal court exercising habeas jurisdiction has the power to release base detainees
“where the Executive detention is indefinite and without authorization in law” and
release into the continental United States is the “only possible effective
remedy.”162
2. Kiyemba III: Immigration Law as the Entry “Framework” That Trumps Habeas Release
On May 28, 2010, in Kiyemba III, the Court of Appeals reinstated its initial
judgment and opinion from February 18, 2009.163 Over a year after Kiyemba I was
decided, five detainees were still on the same island, unable to leave. Continuing
prior legal reasoning emphasizing plenary powers, the Kiyemba III opinion
incorporated factual developments regarding relocation efforts and Congressional
legislation. The court’s per curiam opinion began by emphasizing that the
detainees have no right to be released into the United States, judicial inquiry into
the issues is inappropriate because they are political, and the political branches
have exclusive power to decide which aliens enter and on what terms.164 Since
Kiyemba I, Congress has spoken on the matter by prohibiting public expenditures
157. Id. at 1036–37.
158. See Kiyemba III Petition, supra note 4, at 21.
159. Id. at 21–22.
160. Id. at 22–24 (referring to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) and Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 371 (2005)).
161. Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam.), aff’d on remand, 605 F. 2d 1046
(D.C. Cir 2010).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1047.
164. Id. at 1048.
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to relocate Guantánamo detainees into the United States. The Kiyemba III Court
interpreted seven military spending bills, effectively barring detainee relocation in
the United States generally, as Congress’s statement regarding the specific fate of
these five detainees.165 These bills do not suspend constitutional habeas, as the
DTA and MCA did, since the detainees never possessed a constitutional right to
be relocated into the United States.166 Judge Rogers’s concurring opinion drew a
distinction between the Kiyemba I situation of indefinite detention, when the
district court granted the writ of habeas corpus and the Supreme Court then
granted writ of certiorari, and the May 2010 circumstance in which the Uighur
detainees would not consent to being relocated.167 The Uighurs thus “hold the
keys” to their release from Guantánamo.168 She noted this after describing habeas
as an adaptable remedy and noting that there is a legal difference between a court’s
power to issue the writ and its power to order release.169
The government incorporated many of the Kiyemba I findings in its position
to deny certiorari review in Kiyemba III. It presented the question in this appeal as
including this notion that detainees are “outside the framework of immigration
laws” and asking for relief.170 The government argued that the district court
approved habeas only because no resettlement options existed then171 and
immigration law, in plenary power doctrine and statutory terms, bars their release
into the United States.172 The government’s position emphasized immigration law
as the basis for detention and exclusion; that habeas is working, leading to release
for other detainees; and that all Uighur detainees have received resettlement
options.173 In April 2011, the Supreme Court denied the detainees’ petition for
certiorari review.174 Justice Kagan took no part in the decision, since she had been
165. See id. at 1048 (referring to Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32,
§ 14103, 123 Stat. 1859, 1920 (2009); Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2010, Pub. L. No. 11168, div. B., § 115, 123 Stat. 2023, 2046 (2009); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 552, 123 Stat. 2142, 2177–78 (2009); National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1041, 123 Stat. 2190, 2454–55 (2009); Department of the
Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-88, div. A, §
428, 123 Stat. 2904, 2962 (2009); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 532,
123 Stat. 3034, 3156 (2009); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118,
§ 9011, 123 Stat. 3409, 3466–67 (2009)).
166. Id. at 1048.
167. Id. at 1048–49 (Rogers, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 1050.
169. Id. at 1049 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 780, 787 (2008), and Munaf v.
Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)).
170. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at I, Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011)
(No. 10-775).
171. Id. at 12–13.
172. See id. at 18–23.
173. Letter from Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, to William K. Suter, Clerk of
the Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/04/OSG-letter-in-Kiyemba-III-4-13-11.pdf.
174. See Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba III ),605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
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Solicitor General during earlier pleadings in the case. Joined by three other
Justices, Justice Breyer’s statement explained that there was no legal issue since the
detainees have received resettlement options and the government was not creating
an obstacle to their release.175 In 2009, certiorari had initially been granted when
no remedy seemed available at that time.176 But now the detainees had
resettlement options and they had not shown these options pose any threat of
torture for them.177 For these four justices, the issue concerned whether the
detainees have any options to be relocated. It was presumed that the detainees do
not accept these options since they did not choose the locations and have no
connections to them, they have been in detention for over nine years and do not
trust the government, and they never chose to be captured by the United States in
Pakistan or taken to a detention center in the Caribbean Sea.
In sum, the Kiyemba I and Kiyemba III Court of Appeals opinions illustrate
repeated and poignant plenary power references to justify detention for aliens,
which at this point is indefinite. Despite extraterritorial constitutional habeas
protections in Boumediene, immigration law faithfully serves the role of a fallback
doctrine to exclude rights protections. The habeas issue of release into the United
States may reach the Supreme Court for a ruling if it is presented as indefinite
detention for the five petitioners. The Court’s wording of its denial of certiorari in
Kiyemba I and its reasons for remanding the case, and Judge Rogers’s concurrence
in Kiyemba III point to the significance of any issue raising the possibility of
indefinite detention.178
3. Kiyemba II: The Politics of Torture and International Comity Stop Alien Release
Also focusing on limits for court-ordered habeas release, Kiyemba II relied on
plenary power reasoning to exclude courts from reviewing executive resettlement
efforts for detainees. Kiyemba II’s analysis more directly commented on
international sovereignty, since the question concerned potential torture or
detention by another state after detainee resettlement. Like in Kiyemba I, the main
legal issues in Kiyemba II were court-ordered habeas remedies and whether the
executive must comply with them. This case involved the same detainees, but their
legal claim was to have a court order the executive either not to resettle them, or
to provide notice if they were to be resettled. In this sense, the decision examined
the Uighurs’ legal claims and protections about leaving the base. On its face the
case appeared to present a common law habeas question, but the plenary power
doctrine and statutory immigration law remain extremely relevant. Plenary power

1631 (2011) (mem.).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I ), 555 F.3d 1022, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Kiyemba III, 605
F.3d at 1048.
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reasoning was invoked to justify judicial deference and explain why noncitizens
receive fewer rights protections than citizens do. Focusing legal clarification on
judicial and executive roles in overseas habeas release, Kiyemba II regarded
detention issues of wide-reaching significance. In Munaf v. Geren the Supreme
Court addressed similar issues regarding the detention of U.S. citizens in Iraq. On
the same day as Boumediene, a unanimous court in Munaf found it had habeas
jurisdiction for U.S. citizen detainees in Iraq, but approved their transfer to Iraqi
authority, despite the alleged threat of torture.179 Even though it had habeas
jurisdiction, the Court decided not to exercise it. Guantánamo detainees contested
similar transfers out of fear of torture once transferred to Algeria. Accordingly,
Kiyemba II’s doctrinal reverberations, and thus plenary power reliance, may impact
detentions far beyond those concerning the Uighurs or Guantánamo.180 So far,
three Supreme Court Justices provided a dissenting opinion in the denial of
certiorari in 2010 regarding a transfer bar for a detainee resettled in Algeria,who
feared torture there.181 As this suggests, in the future this issue may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court.
Specifically, in the Kiyemba II decision, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
used plenary reasoning, focusing on foreign relations and international comity, to
find that detainees were not entitled to a thirty-day notice before being transferred
from Guantánamo.182 The detainees argued that such notice was necessary
because they would be tortured or prosecuted if returned to China. Writing for the
court, Judge Ginsburg presented two plenary elements in its reasoning.
First, the Kiyemba II court held that courts cannot review issues involving
torture to stop detainee relocation, because these issues are political. It noted that
when the executive has declared a policy to not transfer detainees to a country that
will likely torture them, a district court may not “second-guess” the executive’s
assessment of this likelihood.183 These assessments belong to the political
branches and not the judiciary.184 The court referred to reasoning in Munaf that
179. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008); see also Harlan Grant Cohen, International Decision:
Munaf v. Geren, 102 AM J. INT’L L. 854 (2008).
180. For instance, the certiorari petition in Khadr v. Obama was filed with the Supreme Court
on these issues. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Khadr v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 2900 (2010) (No. 10-751).
Also, an Algerian detainee who had filed a similar writ of certiorari, Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Mohammed v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 2091 (2011) (No. 10-746), was recently transferred to Algeria,
despite concerns of torture and pending petition for certiorari. See Lyle Denniston, One Significant
Detainee Case Over?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 6, 2011, 7:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/
one-detainee-case-over. Cf In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 706 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D.D.C. 2010);
Lyle Denniston, “Kiyemba II,” Back Again?, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 28, 2010, 8:37 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/kiyemba-ii-back-again.
181. Mohammed v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 32 (2010) (No. 10A52) (denying the detainee’s petition
to stay his transfer with dissents by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, explaining the petition
raises “important questions” “not resolved” by Munaf v. Geren).
182. Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II ), 561 F.3d 509, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
183. Id. at 516.
184. See id. at 514.
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the likelihood of torture is a serious concern, but that habeas did not bar the
transfer of U.S. citizens to Iraq.185 The Kiyemba detainees argued that their claims
are different and not controlled by Munaf, since they seek a bar to removal under
the Convention Against Torture.186 But the court explained that judicial review is
only available for Convention claims if the alien is challenging a final removal
order, and here they were not.187 Accordingly, the court found that because they
were not in immigration proceedings they could not use the Convention to
challenge a removal order. By finding the issue to be political, the court used
plenary reasoning to avoid intervention.
The court also added statutory reasoning concerning the immigration
proceedings to further find it cannot stop any resettlement. The Kiyemba II
decision also found that not being in removal proceedings bars judicial review of
the plaintiffs’ resettlement. Similarly, in Kiyemba I and III, the court found that
because the plaintiffs had not sought entry into the United States through
immigration law procedures they could not be released into the United States.
Accordingly, despite complex habeas and international relations issues,
immigration law provides a fallback to continue their detention.
Second, the court deferred to international comity to reject the detainee
claim that relocation is barred because they will be detained or prosecuted.188 Here
the court highlighted that the United States limits its jurisdiction to its own
territory and that the detainee claims invoke foreign governments and foreign
laws. According to the court, international norms of comity—mostly respect for
foreign jurisdiction and sovereignty—and separation of power principles preclude
judicial inquiry concerning the potential torture of these plaintiffs in whichever
country the executive chooses to send them.189 The executive should not be
second-guessed, so that it is able to conduct the intelligence and negotiations these
matters necessitate. Effectively, this reasoning related detainee release with
political concerns implicit in diplomacy and foreign relations.
Judge Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion emphasized plenary power reasoning,
that aliens have no right of entry and their detention is permitted for territorial
and wartime reasons. It explained that the detainees as aliens are claiming more
rights than what is afforded to U.S. citizens in Munaf.190 Next, the opinion
explained that the law of wartime and regular immigration precludes detainees
from receiving any treatment different than Munaf. Here, detainees are like aliens
at the border or port of entry who have no constitutional right to enter.191 The
185.
186.
1231).
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 514 (citing Munaf, 553 U.S. at 678).
Id. at 514–15 (referring to the Convention Against Torture, as implemented in 8 U.S.C. §
Id. at 515.
Id. at 515–16.
Id. at 515.
See id. at 517–18.
Id. at 519 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210–13, 222–

Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete)

224

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

4/17/2012 1:22 PM

[Vol. 2:193

Kavanaugh concurrence further indicated that because these are wartime aliens,
even if not enemy combatants, the executive may detain and transfer them
without judicial oversight.192 In this case, the complication was that they do not
want to return to China and had no right to enter the United States.193 Judge
Kavanaugh indicated that this detention and transfer practice is in accord with
historical precedent, resting on confidential information and diplomacy.194
Accordingly, any judicial role here is limited because these matters regard
immigration policies and international negotiations.195
A more sympathetic view of detainee rights was presented in Judge Griffith’s
opinion, which concurred in part and dissented in part. It stressed that habeas
requires the ability to challenge the government’s detention and that this is
effectively denied without notice before transfer.196 Judge Griffith noted that
Munaf detainees did have notice of their transfer to Iraq, and thus that case did not
apply to the Uighurs in Guantánamo.197 Judge Griffith treated habeas as a central
obstacle to the plaintiffs’ continued detention since it requires the jailer to justify
detention and, if granted, the detainees must be released.198 The court opinions in
Kiyemba I and Kiyemba II, however, did not take habeas concerns as seriously. Judge
Griffith’s opinion ended by focusing on the Boumediene description of the Great
Writ, which would be greatly diminished without the ability to challenge the
executive’s assurances that their resettlement would not lead to torture or
continued detention.199
Kiyemba II appears on its face as a case about habeas release, but its
justifications in deferring to the executive and limiting alien rights reflect
traditional plenary power norms. Kiyemba I addressed whether alien detainees may
enter the United States, while Kiyemba II examined whether the same aliens may be
transferred outside United States jurisdiction without first giving notice. For this
in-bound and out-bound analysis, the plenary power doctrine severely limits what
a court may review or order. The same doctrine excludes noncitizens from rights
protections both for situations concerning release into the United States and for
those regarding transfer out of U.S. control. Kiyemba II did this as the court still
preserved its habeas jurisdiction but decided not to order release.200 Similarly, the
court employed statutory immigration law analysis to bar its intervention in this
matter—for instance, by enjoining the executive from resettling a detainee after a

23 (1953); Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I), 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
192. Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d at 519–20.
193. Id. at 519 n.5.
194. See id. at 519–20.
195. See id. at 521.
196. See id. at 525–26.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 524.
199. See id. at 526.
200. See id. at 512–13.
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writ of habeas has been granted.
The doctrinal impact of these legal debates is enormous. Similar factual
circumstances may apply to other countries. The transfer of detainees to Algeria in
2010 shows that the law of overseas habeas release potentially impacts transfers to
myriad states where torture and other human rights abuses are a concern.201 Three
judges raised vociferous dissents in a denial for an en banc hearing in the Court of
Appeals for Kiyemba II. They noted the court’s habeas reasoning was
“fundamentally flawed” and inconsistent with Boumediene and habeas guarantees
since the seventeenth century.202 Similarly three Supreme Court justices, out of
four needed to approve certiorari, may view the Kiyemba II issues as distinct from
Munaf.203
C. Kiyemba and Immigration Law: Limited Legal Solutions in the Face of Immovable Politics
Kiyemba I, II, and III show how immigration law doctrines, in particular but
not limited to plenary powers, justify detention even after they have been found to
be unlawful by a district court and long after the executive has ceased classifying
detainees as enemy combatants. While certiorari petitions and appellate review of
Kiyemba cases focus on habeas doctrine, immigration law operates as a fallback to
keep detention legal, even if it is indefinite. This doctrinal quagmire is the product
of factual complexities presented by the detention of these Uighurs. The executive
and judiciary argue that the detainees are choosing not to accept the limited
resettlement options provided and that this keeps them on the base. But it is the
U.S. government that placed these men in this situation after so many years.
Executive choices to detain Uighurs on Guantánamo, rather than choices made by
the Uighurs, created these problems. In this regard, Kiyemba detainees differ greatly
from many aliens in most immigration law cases, who chose to enter the United
States. Given this factual and legal impasse, the executive, consistent with
historical practice, employs immigration law as an instrument to detain aliens and
deny rights protections in times of national security. Foreign policy objectives, in
this case the War on Terror, set the stage for this treatment of aliens. Here the
foreign nationals are Uighurs resisting China, caught in the Afghanistan conflict,
and brought by the United States government to Cuba.
In theory, court-ordered habeas release from the extraterritorial jurisdiction
of Guantánamo could result in their release, but the doctrinal challenges to this are
substantial. Put simply, the judiciary does not find that developing this doctrine is
as important as the challenges it creates, even if it effectively turns an eye away
from the likelihood of indefinite detention. At the Court of Appeals and Supreme
201. See supra note 180.
202. See Order Denying Petition for Initial En Banc Hearing, Obama v. Abdah, 630 F.3d 1047
(2011); see also Lyle Denniston, Munaf Sequel Left Undisturbed, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 11, 2011, 7:00 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/munaf-sequel-left-undisturbed.
203. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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Court levels, the judiciary appears hesitant to make new extraterritorial rights
determinations, which would be the outcome of a court order to release them
from a U.S. base in Cuba. Similarly, such an order would potentially meddle with
diplomatic efforts, upsetting separation of powers. Kiyemba II clearly shows that
the judiciary will not question or try to check this executive power. To resettle
these men, the executive negotiates with the consular officers from diplomatic
corps from countries other than China. Moreover, the Kiyemba III petition asks
that a habeas remedy, in the form of release from Guantánamo, requires domestic
entry into the United States. As described below, this can be achieved with the
executive’s authority to parole aliens into the United States. However, this requires
the political will of the President and the Department of Homeland Security.
Given popular resistance of Americans and lawmakers to relocating Guantánamo
detainees domestically, this seems unlikely for now. More generally, the Obama
administration has eliminated plans to create a new detention center in Illinois for
base inmates or to try them in domestic courts because of the political fallout.204
This resistance is fueled by popular and public anxieties about the War on Terror
and the judiciary’s role in this conflict.205 The problem here remains that the law
defers solutions to the political branches. National and global politics inhibit the
development of these solutions. The detainees, the United States, and China all
resist the options provided so far.
In October 2009, the Supreme Court did grant certiorari for detainee
petitions in Kiyemba I and II when it appeared that they would remain indefinitely
on the base with no option to be resettled. A few months later, the detainees
received new resettlement offers from Palau and Switzerland. The Supreme Court
then declined to review these cases.206 Justice Breyer, joined by three justices,
argued that the detainees had options to relocate, but that the Uighurs were
choosing not to accept them. He added that there had been no meaningful
challenge to the appropriateness of these offers and that the Government
presented “uncontested commitment” to resettle them.207 As such, there was “no
Government-imposed obstacle” to the Uighurs’ timely release and “appropriate
resettlement.”208
The remaining five detainees have rejected these offers for various reasons.
Given that they have been detained in Guantánamo since 2002, captured in
Pakistan a decade ago, and interrogated by Chinese officials while on the base,
204. See generally Charlie Savage, House Panel Rejects a Plan to Shift Detainees to Illinois, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 2010, at A18.
205. See MJ Lee, Eric Holder: We Aim to Close Gitmo Before Election Day, POLITICO (Sept. 20,
2011, 9:46 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/64083.html; MJ Lee, Rep. Adam Smith:
Hard to Close Gitmo by ‘12, POLITICO, (Sept. 21, 2011, 5:44 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/
stories/0911/64083.html.
206. Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011) (mem.).
207. Id.
208. Id.
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they are suspicious of what American authorities tell them. They have no
connections to Palau or Switzerland. They understandably seek some security and
cultural familiarity, which they argue a Uighur community in the United States
would provide. It is also reported that relocation experiences of former detainees
in Bermuda, Albania, and Palau provide far less than what was promised. The legal
and factual developments leave the courts asking why the detainees refuse to
accept the resettlement options provided. The court is unwilling to be more
reflective of how the United States has treated these noncombatants. Instead the
court simply asks whether their continued detention is illegal and whether their
release is required by law. In spite of the doctrinal limbos created by immigration,
foreign relations, and habeas law, the judiciary presents the detainees as “hold[ing]
the keys” to their release.209
D. Parole: Political Limitations Trump Immigration Law’s Power to End Detentions
Under the executive’s authority, parole remains a viable legal option to
release the five Uighurs from the base. With parole, the executive permits an alien
to enter the United States without any particular visa or refugee status.210 The
court in Kiyemba I discounted this option, claiming it requires that an alien must be
applying for admission and that an alien refugee cannot qualify unless it is for
“compelling reasons in the public interest.”211 This is troubling given parole’s
flexibility and historic use. It has been used by the United States on various
occasions when aliens did not have a designated legal right to enter the United
States, including Hungarian refugees after 1956, Cuban and Southeast Asian
refugees before the Refugee Act of 1980, Soviet Union nationals after 1988, and
Cuban refugees in 1994.212 Presidents have used the power of parole to permit the
entry of foreigners when visa categories did not neatly match up or were used up,
at times allowing entry for large groups of foreigners.213
The court though overlooks how parole can easily remedy the problems of
indefinite detention, detainees without any specific right to enter the United
States, unclear extraterritorial reach of habeas remedies, and an ineffective habeas
release order. Statutory law and migration practices, benefiting from a long history
and case precedent, suggest that the Uighurs can be paroled in the United States.
The problem is that the executive does not want to do so, given domestic political
resistance and foreign relations concerns. If the appropriate departments of the
209. See Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba III ), 605 F.3d 1046, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
210. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 664 (6th
ed. 2008) (describing parole as an “outstandingly flexible tool” for the executive that allows for an
alien’s “physical presence” despite disqualifications such as § 212(a) inadmissibility, lack of eligibility
under nationality quotas, or other preferences).
211. Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I ), 555 F.3d 1022, 1031 (2009) (referring to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A)).
212. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 210, at 664–65.
213. Id.

Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete)

228

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

4/17/2012 1:22 PM

[Vol. 2:193

executive branch worked to allow the Uighurs to enter the United States, they
could easily be paroled without acting outside the authority of the Department of
Homeland Security or State.
Developed by the administrative ingenuity of immigration officials early last
century, parole is a remedy allowing a noncitizen to travel away from the border
and immigration detention.214 It is currently provided for in INA section
212(d)(5),215 with its regulations in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5.216 The Uighurs arguably
qualify for either of the two statutory justifications for parole, which are for
“urgent humanitarian reasons” or “significant public benefit.”217 Their detention
for nine years on a U.S. base, capture in and transport from Pakistan, and inability
to return home or to third countries may meet the humanitarian and public
benefit justifications. The regulations provide various examples of these
justifications, involving juvenile, family, pregnancy, medical, and court appearance
reasons.218 With parole for “urgent humanitarian reasons,” the United States could
end their indefinite detention, which surely deprives them of important liberties.
While their parole entry into the United States would result in the “significant
public benefit” of ending this detention, it raises foreign relations and
constitutional habeas problems. The most obvious way to craft a parole remedy
would be to determine that their continued detention “is not in the public
interest,” or that their entry into the United States fulfills a humanitarian need.
This could be determined by officials authorized to grant parole.219 These are
mostly Assistant Secretary and Director level officials in the Department of
Homeland Security, also including district directors, special agents, and field
directors.220 The regulations state that any parole justification is determined on a
“case-by-case basis,”221 suggesting legal precedent or parole categories would not
be created by such a remedy.
Political will is needed from the President or Secretary of Homeland Security
to decide to parole the Uighurs into the United States, and so far this has been
lacking, given the nonlegal context described below. These arguments assume
what is in the public and court record. It is arguable that the executive branch, in
the form of military, intelligence, homeland security, and foreign relations officials,
has access to information justifying decisions to deny parole for the detainees.
Parole is a remedy option provided that the alien does not “present a security risk”

214. Id. at 663.
215. The authority to parole is discretionary. Parole is “temporary” and may be prescribed
“only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) (2006).
216. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (2011).
217. Id. § 212.5(b).
218. Id. § 212.5(b)(1–4).
219. Id. § 212.5(b)(5).
220. Id. § 212.5(a).
221. Id. § 212.5(b).
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or “risk of absconding.”222 Information kept under seal may in theory suggest that
their security or flight risk is likely. Similarly, the executive may find that the
Uighurs’ parole into the United States could threaten diplomatic relations with
China, and is thus inconsistent with the “public interest.”223 These two political
determinations by the executive branch may preclude parole for these five men.
Regardless, the court in Kiyemba I quickly dismissed parole, even though the
remedy is a legal option within the immigration law framework. The Court could
have urged this option or have suggested that the executive explore it, instead of
quickly reverting to plenary reasoning and simple statutory bars. Five men remain
in detention indefinitely after they were brought against their will from Pakistan to
Cuba. The Court justified detention on Guantánamo as legal within immigration
law. But immigration law itself provides legal and established ways to permit entry
in the United States. Parole is a flexible option that respects the separation of
power concerns and political questions used to justify the plenary power
doctrine.224 Parole’s legal codification, agency interpretation, and varied use for
decades suggest that this remedy for the Uighurs could end indefinite detention
and avoid encroaching on political authority.
If the executive did choose to parole these five men, it would be based on its
political choices, weighing domestic and foreign relations issues. This option is
consistent with immigration law practice and has been used historically, in
situations such as Mezei and Knauff, when courts left an alien in indefinite exclusion
or indefinite detention due to perceived foreign relations and national security
concerns.225 Parole is a flexible and legal option applied for decades in situations
like the ones faced by the Kiyemba detainees.
The Supreme Court has argued that parole developed as an administrative
tool is necessary to avoid “needless confinement” and does not affect an alien’s
immigration status.226 Since it eliminates detention for aliens who are not likely to
abscond, it “reflects humane qualities of an enlightened civilization.”227 Parole is
not equivalent to admission.228 The executive may require detailed conditions for
any parole, including: assurances that the alien will appear in hearings or depart the
United States when required to do so; a paid bond; counsel or sponsor to ensure
their appearances and departure; community ties and known addresses of close
relatives; and periodic reporting.229 Parole is not automatically renewed and may

222. Id.
223. Id. § 212.5(b)(5).
224. The executive decision to parole is close to plenary and provides for broad discretion. See
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B) (2006); 3B AM. JUR. 2D, Aliens and Citizens § 1327 (1962) (summarizing
interpretations by Courts of Appeal on parole authority).
225. Weisselberg, supra note 110, at 951–52.
226. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958).
227. Id.
228. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2006).
229. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d)(1)–(3) (2011).
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be terminated without written notice.230
The Uighurs are not classified as or have not been found to be refugees, but
the Court presented this as a bar to their parole. An alien who is a refugee may be
paroled into the United States for “compelling reasons in the public interest.”231
The INA explains that these reasons are “with respect to that particular alien”
being paroled versus admitted as refugee.232 For the Uighurs the particular reasons
could be that they do not meet refugee persecution standards, did not freely leave
Pakistan and were taken to an overseas American base by the United States, and
the status quo risks indefinite detention and continuing unlawful detention.
Regardless, they are not seeking asylum or classification as refugees, so the Court’s
argument may be premature or misplaced. Furthermore, refugee status is not a
complete bar to parole, since aliens who establish a credible fear of persecution or
torture may be paroled into the United States. ICE interprets parole in INA
section 212(d)(5)233 as permitting its agents to release aliens who establish a
credible fear of persecution or torture.234 While this interpretation applies to aliens
in situations quite different from the Uighurs, since they are not applying for
asylum or have been not been detained under expedited removal, it does suggest
parole is not a categorical bar for aliens claiming persecution or torture.
The Court also stated parole is limited to aliens seeking admissions and that
the Uighurs were not doing that. Established parole practices and agency
interpretation suggest aliens who are paroled do not need to be actually applying
for admission. The Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) functions with the position that aliens apprehended
at the border may be eligible for parole.235 Aliens may be paroled if they are
“arriving aliens,”236 which includes aliens who do not actually apply for admission,
such as those apprehended at the border or those interdicted and brought to the
United States “even if they are not seeking admission.”237 The Uighurs, who were
captured in Pakistan and taken to a U.S. base, never sought to enter the United
States before being detained. Their situation is similar to the “arriving alien”
criteria involving apprehension and interdiction.
In sum, the Kiyemba triumvirate of cases has justified detention of the
Uighurs with immigration law, in the form of statutory and plenary power

230. Id. § 212.5(e) (2011).
231. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(B).
232. Id.
233. See supra note 215.
234. IRA KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 145–46 (12th ed. 2010)
(summarizing Memorandum from John Morton, Asst. Sec., Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture (Dec. 8, 2009)
(published on AILA InfoNet at Doc. No. 09121760)).
235. Id. at 141.
236. 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q) and § 1001.1(q).
237. KURZBAN, supra note 234, at 141–43.
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justifications. This effectively nullifies constitutional holdings that the Uighurs’
detention is unlawful and the corresponding district court order for their habeas
release. A legal and political remedy is available in immigration law with the
executive’s power to parole the detainees into the United States. This would
effectively accomplish what the detainees seek in Kiyemba II and III, that is, release
from Guantánamo and no resettlement in China. It would also avoid creating any
new doctrinal findings of court-ordered release (when the executive can choose
not to comply), habeas remedies in extraterritorial jurisdiction, judicial review of
resettlement negotiations, and entry into the domestic United States for aliens
currently located on an extraterritorial base.
III. UIGHURS’ TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL IDENTITY: ALIEN, DETAINEE,
AND THE WAR ON TERROR
This Section begins to identify the nonlegal forces that facilitate the law’s
exclusionary pressures for Uighurs at Guantánamo. Importantly, the debates
raised by the Kiyemba cases could be resolved by various political developments. In
theory, plenary power reasoning places the Kiyemba issues within the authority of
the executive or legislative branches, which are more capable in resolving these
matters. Court opinions invariably point to executive expertise in diplomacy or
Congressional positions as expressions of sovereign will as the reasons why these
two branches, rather than the judiciary, should handle these detention and
immigration issues. The problem for the Kiyemba plaintiffs is that political
solutions are not possible given the political situation of their country of origin,
how they were captured and taken to Guantánamo, and the judiciary’s contested
role in the War on Terror. Given the limitations in U.S. law as it has been
interpreted so far, the Uighurs must rely on the political branches, as opposed to
the judiciary, for resolution to their plight. But there are no ready solutions in the
political realm either. This Part highlights how nonlegal issues that are much
broader in scope than potential judicial release after habeas is granted keep these
men detained. As such, even though plenary power reasoning operates as a
fallback to legally justify their detention, and the habeas doctrine for now does not
support a court-ordered release, nonlegal developments keep them detained.
Though, as described above, legal doctrine authorizing detention is easily
justified, what is far less probable is a nonlegal resolution. Uighur detention on
Guantánamo could easily end if the United States permits their domestic entry as
parolees on a humanitarian basis; permits the domestic entry of base detainees or
some Kiyemba detainees to convince third countries of its good will so they will
provide resettlement offers to Kiyemba detainees; resettles them despite their
current protest; or achieves greater international goodwill by ending all
Guantánamo detentions.238 Similarly, China could accept the Uighur detainees but
238.

Congress has very clearly stated it does not want any Guantánamo detainees brought to
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not prosecute, detain, or torture them, or ignore their resettlement in third
countries or the United States. A third country could not worry about diplomatic
tensions with China because it accepts the Uighur detainees, or offer detainees
resettlement despite U.S. refusal to accept detainees domestically. These political
options for the United States or China and individual choices for the detainees
would end the detention for these five men. This section refers to these options to
examine the causes of this current impasse that concern policy rather than law.
The majority of these options suggest that international relations between
China, the United States, and third countries create the Kiyemba legal impasse.
These developments are not fully disclosed due to their national security and
diplomatic sensitivities. News stories, Wikileaks distribution of diplomatic
communiqués, and the Government’s position in Kiyemba litigation point to the
secretive nature of resettlement options.239 The U.S.-specific reasons suggest that
cultural barriers preclude the Uighurs’ entry, since aliens, base detainees, and
formerly suspected terrorists are barred from entering. Very simply, diplomatic
progress or change in domestic attitudes about bringing detainees to the United
States could resolve the Kiyemba impasse. This would make the application of
plenary powers and new habeas determinations unnecessary. Nonetheless, all of
the reasons presented above feed the current legal impasse. Their genesis lies in
conflicts in the international system that the law is forced to address.
It is important to place Kiyemba detentions in the context of historic
indefinite detention justified by immigration law doctrine such as Mezei. So far
there has been an effort to protect the detainees from mistreatment in China
and/or protect their wishes not to be resettled without their approval. In theory
this is a more favorable situation than the indefinite detention limbo on Ellis
Island upheld by the Supreme Court in Mezei.240
To make sense of the law’s limitations in resolving the Kiyemba debates and
the context that lead to indefinite detentions, this section raises two points. First,
it describes relevant assumptions in the law of alienage and Guantánamo
detentions in the War on Terror. The Uighurs’ detention predicament is consistent
with exclusionary effects in the law of alienage and overseas detentions. While
the United States See Carol Rosenberg, How Congress Helped Thwart Obama’s Plan to Close Guantánamo,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 23, 2011, at A1.
239. For descriptions of the intense diplomatic negotiations and secrecy of Uighur
resettlements, see generally Charlie Savage & Andrew W. Lehren, Cables Depict Coaxing by U.S. in Bid to
Clear Guantánamo’s Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at A1, and Nancy Talanian, WikiLeaks Release
Cables on Guantánamo, Bagram, and Rendition: What Might Have Been, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 10, 2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancy-talanian/wikileaks-releases-cables_b_795083.html.
240. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (affirming Mezei’s
indefinite detention on Ellis Island, with justifications in Congressional legislation and plenary power
deference for national security matters, after no third state would accept him). But see Weisselberg,
supra note 110 (describing the executive compromise permitting Mezei to be paroled into the United
States and how the historical record shows the exaggerated national security justifications to exclude
Mezei).
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Uighur detentions continue, their situation reflects larger exclusionary trends in
immigration law and detention policies. Insider/outsider dynamics of citizenship
and alienage, de facto discrimination based on the nationalities of Guantánamo
detainees, and cultural and geopolitical assumptions about the War on Terror
shape what legal options the Kiyemba detainees may receive. The legal doctrine
applied to these detentions is framed by significant assumptions on citizenship
and alienage, racial exclusion, and overseas military operations. To begin exploring
why this happens, and to provide the context that creates legal disputes and then
limits their resolution, this section initiates a transnational exploration.241
Second, this section employs a transnational analysis of Uighur migration
from China to a U.S. base in Cuba. Identifying the geopolitical contexts evident in
their path from Western China to Central Asia, this uncovers how unlikely a
political resolution to their detention will be. For migrants (“aliens” as the law
refers to them), “transnational analysis” examines actors, forces, and events that
contribute to peoples’ movement across international borders.242 Importantly, this
approach does not solely focus on the perspective of receiving migrants. For
example, such an analysis of Mexico-U.S. migration would look at push-and-pull
factors in both countries and the crossborder forces that facilitate this movement.
Transnational analysis of migration examines the movement of persons from the
perspectives of sending states, receiving states, and the space connecting these
sites of departure and receipt. The first location is often called a “home,”
“sending,” or “departure” state, while the second location is labeled the “host,”
“receipt,” or “destination” state. The third focus, the “connecting space,” includes
examples such as social networks, commerce and trade, crossborder ideologies,
refugee flight, foreign relations, crossborder conflicts, labor flows, and travel.
These unite or facilitate population movements across political borders. In sum, a
transnational examination of migration looks for causes and effects from three
different perspectives: sending, receiving, and the space in between.243

241. Judge Philip Jessup defined “transnational law” as “all law which regulates actions or
events that transcend national frontiers.” PHILLIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW: STORRS
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 2 (1956).
242. This approach builds on transnational methodologies to examine plenary power and
international sovereignty. See Hernández-López, Sovereignty Migrates in U.S. and Mexican Law, supra note
29, at 1355–57. Migration scholars provide detailed descriptions of transnationalism. Rainer Bauböck
suggests that “political transnationalism” happens when migrants having “overlapping memberships”
in independent and territorially separated polities. See Rainer Bauböck, Towards a Political Theory of
Migrant Transnationalism, 37 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 700, 700–02 (2003). Linda Basch et al. define
“‘transnationalism’ as the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social
relations that link to together their societies of origin and settlement” which “cross geographic,
cultural, and political borders.” See NATIONS UNBOUND: TRANSNATIONAL PROJECTS,
POSTCOLONIAL PREDICAMENTS, AND DETERRITORIALIZED NATION STATES 7 (Linda Basch et al.
eds., 1994).
243. David Fitzgerald provides a sophisticated discussion of transnational methodologies in
Towards a Theoretical Ethnography of Migration, 29 QUALITATIVE SOC. 1 (2006).
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When legal doctrine is studied with an appreciation for the context it is
applied to, the normative influence of transnational forces begins to appear. In the
Kiyemba cases, the doctrine concerns habeas and plenary powers, and the context is
Uighur detention in the War on Terror. The forced migration of the detainees,
who were literally captured and taken against their will, occurred when the U.S.
military transported them from Pakistan to the base at Guantánamo. But a whole
host of transnational events and actors also influences why these Uighur men are
detained and how U.S. law responds. Transnational influences operate in China as
the sending state, the United States as the receiving state, and in the connections
between both states.
Legal doctrine applied to Uighur detentions implicates assumptions about
citizenship and alienage, racial exclusion, and overseas military operations.
Transnational influences shape these assumptions. These influences come from
China, the United States, and connecting forces between them—for example,
terrorism and counterterrorism, ideologies of human and individual rights,
overseas military operations, diplomacy, and foreign relations.
A. Uighur Detention as Racism: Exclusion in Alienage, Nationalities, and War on Terror
The Kiyemba cases show how alienage can be a powerful doctrinal barrier to
recognizing rights protections for noncombatant detainees, even after the
Supreme Court in Boumediene affirmed generous extraterritorial habeas protections
for noncitizens.244 Linda Bosniak’s proposal to examine the normative force of
alienage and citizenship together illuminates a great deal in the Kiyemba legal
debates. In The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership, Bosniak
explains that these two legal doctrines are motivated by distinct concerns. This
explains their divergent and at times contradictory determinations.245 Legal norms
concerning aliens focus on “hard” distinctions applied to outsiders and to those
who are viewed as possible threats to the community.246 Looking outside, to
threats or to the unknown, alienage and immigration law poses “hard” doctrinal
barriers, whereas more permissive “soft” reasoning for citizenship norms may
afford resident aliens increased rights protections.247 Citizenship’s focus on
equality and harmonious community support this “soft” and tolerant quality.
Bosniak’s suggestion of “hard” outside and “soft” inside reasoning sheds
light on the Kiyemba quagmire, suggested by the taglines: habeas release v. rights

244.
245.

See discussion supra Part II.B–C.
LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP 1–2 (2006). Linda K. Kerber describes indefinite detention for aliens as part of a longterm historical trend of “stateless” persons as “Citizen’s Other.” See generally Linda K. Kerber,
Presidential Address: The Stateless as the Citizen’s Other: A View from the United States, 112 AM. HIST. REV. 1
(2007).
246. BOSNIAK, supra note 245, at 4–5.
247. Id.
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denials and an extraterritorial Constitution v. plenary power exclusions. Boumediene
affirmed common law habeas when aliens, even when they are held overseas, are
captured during military conflict, and are not members of the U.S. community.
Since the Court focused on habeas suspension and its disruption to separations of
powers, “soft” legal reasoning permitted judicial review. An incident of this would
be alien rights protections. Boumediene’s main narrative remains one of habeas and
separation of powers.248 Even if its focus on habeas may be less about individual
rights than about the role of courts, this is consistent with historic common law
habeas practice.249 Kiyemba I presents a far more elaborate question that becomes
an alienage issue.250 This results in the plaintiffs’ exclusion because they are
regarded as aliens before the law as opposed to incidents of a separation of
powers debate. Here in Kiyemba I and III, detainees asked to be relocated to the
United States. For this, courts would order the executive to release them. Kiyemba
II suggests human rights and antitorture protections justify judicial limits on the
diplomacy of resettlement.251 In both cases, the judicial orders implicate
governmental powers protected by plenary reasoning—for example, migration,
foreign relations, diplomacy, war, alien entry, and extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Factually and legally, the Kiyemba cases present social and cultural realities far less
abstract than habeas suspension. Boumediene petitioners asked the court for judicial
review. Kiyemba petitioners asked to live in the United States, came from China,
asked for human rights protections, were caught in Pakistan, were regarded as
terrorists, have been detained in Guantánamo for nearly nine years, and are
Muslims.252 At one point, Departments of Homeland Security and Justice officials
proposed permitting some Uighur detainees to be released into Virginia.253 These
plans became impossible politically for any detainee, much less Uighurs. Bosniak’s
“hard” and “soft” approach inspires asking: what justifies legal reasoning to
exclude or include? When this approach is applied to the Uighurs, it appears that
alien exclusions are fueled by cultural assumptions on race and on overseas
military operations.
Next, with an examination of detainee nationalities and their exclusion from
legal protections, the detention program at Guantánamo reflects de facto racist
discrimination. Base detentions and “unlawful enemy combatants” classifications
248. See discussion supra Part II.A. In order to have the Supreme Court review their petition,
Uighur detainees still present their case as one concerning the “elemental aspect” of judicial power
and how the Court of Appeals delegates a “quintessentially judicial function to” the executive. See
Kiyemba III Petition, supra note 4, at 3.
249. See Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, supra note 10.
250. See discussion supra Part II.B.
251. See discussion supra Part II.B.iii.
252. Cf. Saban Willett, Union Club Address (Feb. 17, 2011), available at http://www.
lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Saban-Willett-Feb-17-Speech.pdf (speech from a
detainee’s attorney describing U.S. xenophobia as influencing policies to bar Uighur detainee entry).
253. See Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle over Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 16, 2010, at 52.
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created proxies in American law to specifically exclude persons from rights
protections.254 Initial White House justifications claimed that unlawful enemy
combatants did not enjoy protections in international law and that this resembled
historic denials of similar rights for savages or barbarians in colonial wars.255
Interestingly, a Washington Post report states that the Chinese detainee population
was twenty-two, placing China in the second tier of nationalities represented along
with Algeria.256 Of these twenty-two, five remain detained and brought the claims
in the Kiyemba cases. Compiling the numbers of all base detainees since 2002, the
Washington Post reports Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Pakistan each had
more than seventy, making them the most represented. But Chinese detainees (i.e.,
the Uighurs) include a sizably larger population than those from forty-four other
countries.257 Most of these detainees may be from countries, especially the top
four mentioned, from which the United States had particular strategic reasons to
detain based on the Afghanistan campaign. China’s sizable population at the base,
relative to all 779 inmates, does suggest Chinese nationality was relevant to the
choice to detain them. Based on reviews of WikiLeaks documents released in April
of 2011, the New York Times reports a detainee’s country of origin appears as the
most important factor for determining if they can be released.258
Drawing inferences concerning the law’s racial exclusions from detainee
demographics is difficult.259 Detainee nationalities indicate that most are from the
Persian Gulf or Central Asia, regions vital to American security in terms of the
War on Terror and regional geopolitics. The Uighur homeland and the place the
Uighurs were captured are both in Central Asia. Because American law reserves
detention primarily for these populations, detention practices suggest a
254. When incorporated by the Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the “enemy combatant”
classification did not enjoy firm doctrinal support. See Jenny S. Martinez, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 124 S.
Ct. 2633. United States Supreme Court, June 28, 2004, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 785–87 (2004) (explaining
that no statute had defined or used the term and that the laws of war and international humanitarian
law do not frequently use the term).
255. See generally Frédéric Mégret, From ‘Savages’ to ‘Unlawful Combatants:’ A Postcolonial Look at
International Humanitarian Law’s ‘Other,’ in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 298–301 (Anne
Orford ed., 2006).
256. See Names of the Detained: Results, WASH. POST, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/
guantanamo/search/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). The database is based on the 2006 list released by
the Pentagon, unofficial sources, news accounts, legal documents, interviews with attorneys and
relatives, and online sources.
257. For a more detailed discussion of how detainee nationality demographics suggest de
facto discrimination and its correlation to the geopolitics of the War on Terror, see HernándezLópez, Guantánamo as a “Legal Black Hole,” supra note 9.
258. See Scott Shane & Benjamin Weiser, Judging Detainees’ Risk, Often with Flawed Evidence, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2011, at A1.
259. BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE CURRENT DETAINEE POPULATION
OF GUANTÁNAMO: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 1, 3 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
reports/2008/1216_detainees_wittes.aspx?rssid=wittesb (follow “Full Report” hyperlink) (stating the
Dept. of Defense has declined to give a precise number of those actually held and information is
“strangely obscure” with changes to the population’s makeup remaining “fuzzy”).
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discriminatory impact in the detention program’s application. With regard to the
twenty-two Uighurs, detainees from China appear not as an accident, isolated or
limited. One or two men represent the majority of the forty-eight nationalities at
the base detention center.260 This suggests it is not an accident or aberration that
China is one of the most represented countries at the base detention center, with
twenty-two out of 779 detainees being from this particular nationality.
Referring to American law’s racialization of foreigners and the War on
Terror, critical race legal scholarship inspires inquiries on base detentions and race.
It elucidates how immigration and alienage law stems from, and never fully breaks
with, social mechanisms to exclude certain races from American rights
protections. Kevin Johnson describes how alienage serves as a proxy for race in
U.S. law.261 He ties in history, social, legal, foreign, and domestic analyses.
Immigration law, with explicit intent or ignored effect, discriminates against
citizens and noncitizens of color. Johnson explains not only how social biases feed
lawmaking, but how racism provided the initial reasoning for sovereignty-based
immigration doctrine.262 The plenary power doctrine justifies why political
branches have plenary powers in foreign relations, overseas territories, and
immigration matters. This frames how American law approaches base detention,
by focusing jurisprudence on national security, base location, and detainee
alienage.
Uighur detention on Guantánamo is produced by a far larger and complex
set of political, economic, and cultural events, most notably the War on Terror.
Despite legal ambiguity on habeas or alienage, the exclusionary culture of
detentions, and the clear normative stance of the plenary powers doctrine, the War
on Terror has produced a serious set of global events and resulted in nearly 800
men being detained on the base. The law justifying Uighur detentions is just one
element of this. As such, understanding what motivates this armed conflict may
help explain why legal exclusions are applied to alien detainees. Historical trends in
foreign and economic relations and American culture assumptions have facilitated
this war for nearly a decade. The impasse felt by the Kiyemba detainees is a product
of the War on Terror and, more specifically, long-term foreign relations trends
which seek to intervene overseas. Similar to the exclusionary assumptions of
alienage and detention, the historic propensity for U.S. foreign relations to
intervene overseas creates the context which results in Uighur detentions.
The United States has presented the War on Terror as a war for civilization

260. See generally Names of the Detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, WASH. POST,
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2011); The Guantánamo
Docket: Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/by-country (last
visited Sept. 30, 2011).
261. See Johnson, Race, supra note 38, at 291–96.
262. See id. at 290–91.
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that entails fighting an irrational and lawless enemy.263 Early in 2002, when news
broke about Guantánamo detentions, the White House presented the detainees as
Al-Qaeda murderers, the “worst of the worst,” and because of their suicidal
nature, willingness, and training, individuals who will “go out and kill and destroy
and engage in suicide.”264 Since then, Government reports on detainees confirm
that this was far from true.265 America’s preeminence on the global stage and
unrivaled power foments its duty to save civilization. Issued by the White House,
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America repeatedly conveys this
humanitarian duty in the War.266 As such, American values and its goals for the
War on Terror became universal objectives for the whole world.267
U.S. foreign relations history suggests that economic and cultural motives
mutually support overseas military involvement. William Appleman Williams’s
Tragedy of American Diplomacy explains how economic objectives, accompanied by
military means to enforce them and the willingness to impose American ideals

263. Natsu Taylor Saito presents five premises for the War on Terror: (1) the enemy is evil; (2)
evil is embodied in the terrorist and rogue state; (3) enemies will not act rationally and normal rules of
war do not apply; (4) Western civilization, representing universal values of freedom and democracy, is
being defended; and (5) “the United States embodies the highest stage of . . . civilization.” Natsu
Taylor Saito, Colonial Presumptions: The War on Terror and the Roots of American Exceptionalism, 1 GEO. J. L.
& MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 67, 69 (2008).
264. Ari Fleischer, White House Press Sec’y, White House Briefing (Jan. 23, 2002), available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/transcripts/0201/23/se.01.html.
265. See GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT (2010), http://media.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/pdf/GTMOtaskforcereport_052810.pdf?sid=ST2010052803890
(stating that roughly ten percent of detainees played a direct role in attacks on the U.S., twenty
percent had significant organizational roles in Al Qaeda or associated groups, less than ten percent
were Taliban leaders or members of anticoalition militia groups, the majority were “[l]ow-level foreign
fighters” lacking any leadership or specialized role in Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated groups, and
approximately five percent did not fit into any of these four categories).
266. The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America described the
United States as:
Possess[ing] unprecedented—and unequalled—strength and influence in the world.
Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the value of a free society, this position
comes with unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The great strength
of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.
OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, NAT’L SEC. STRATEGY OF THE U.S.A. 1 (Sept.
2002), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss_sep2002.pdf.
While later National Security Strategies issued by Presidents Bush and Obama distance
themselves from unilateralism, preemptive force, and the security focus primarily on Islamic
terrorism, they still highlight American superiority and a duty to lead in international affairs. See, e.g.,
OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, NAT’L SEC. STRATEGY MAY 2010, at 1 (2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf
(presenting military superiority as underpinning global security and explaining that, after decades of
leadership, the United States will “continue to underwrite global security,” “focuse[s] on renewing
American leadership,” and “recognizes the fundamental connection between our national security,
our national competitiveness, resilience, and moral example”).
267. See Susanne Soederberg, The War on Terrorism and American Empire, in THE WAR ON
TERRORISM AND THE AMERICAN ‘EMPIRE’ AFTER THE COLD WAR 165–66 (Alejandro Colás &
Richard Saull eds., 2006).
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abroad, masked foreign policy initiatives as neutral.268 This began with the “Open
Door” policy of the 1890s. The idea that economic frontiers were not coextensive
with territorial frontiers encapsulated American expansion during the fall of
formal European colonialism, consequent decolonization, two world wars, and the
Cold War.269 Public discourse raises similar viewpoints when referring to combat
in Iraq and Afghanistan: superpower status, economic size, overseas influence,
and American exceptionalism regarding multilateral obligations, international law,
and human rights.270 Historian and former U.S. Army Colonel Andrew J. Bacevich
makes this argument after examining foreign, military, and economic policies and
their domestic cultural influence.271 He argues that the U.S. empire is based on
American objectives of “openness” seeking to remove barriers for the “movement
of goods, capital, people, and ideas” and “fostering an integrated international
order conducive to American interests, governed by American norms, regulated
by American power, and, above all, satisfying the expectations of the American
people for ever-greater abundance.”272 Consistently since World War I, these
objectives are presented as security for capitalism and democracy but more
realistically they represent an American need to influence and dominate. Military
policies support these objectives by seeking international order and promoting
U.S. interests with technical and logistic superiority stretched across the globe.
Domestically, Americans are seduced by militarism and interventions overseas,
making the world safe for free trade and democratic values.273 Cultural notions of
the good life and freedom—easy credit, abundant oil, and cheap goods—create a
need for U.S. empire-building in foreign, military, and economic terms.274
These cultural and economic forces, often resulting in war or armed struggle
overseas, produce Uighur detentions. The foreign policy narrative stresses
humanitarian duty and cultural neutrality in this context. In sum, Uighur-detainee
rights exclusion is a product of legal determinations on alien status; detentions
focused on certain nationalities, specifically from the Persian Gulf or Central Asia;
and the War on Terror motivated by economic objectives and ideologies of

268. See WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 191
(3d ed. 1972).
269. Lloyd C. Gardner, Foreword to WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, THE TRAGEDY OF
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY ix, x (paperback ed. 2009).
270. See generally EMPIRE’S LAW: THE AMERICAN IMPERIAL PROJECT AND THE “WAR TO
REMAKE THE WORLD” (Amy Bartholomew ed., 2006); Tony Judt, Dreams of Empire, 51 N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Nov. 4, 2004, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/nov/04/dreamsof-empire/; Paul Krugman, White Man’s Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at A27. For a sympathetic
view of American empire, see Niall Ferguson, Hegemony or Empire?, 82 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 154 (2003).
271. See ANDREW J. BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE REALITIES AND CONSEQUENCES
OF U.S. DIPLOMACY 3 (2002).
272. Id. at 88.
273. See generally ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM: HOW
AMERICANS ARE SEDUCED BY WAR (2005).
274. See generally id.
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superiority and humanitarian duty. This context creates the need, so argued, for
overseas detention programs and, more importantly, to become involved in
Central Asian affairs. Uighur detentions in Guantánamo are a product of this
context. They are not the accident that habeas litigation positions suggest. As
described below, similar forces facilitate migrant sending, receiving, and crossborder activity. Kiyemba detainees have been in a series of hotbeds of legal,
cultural, and geopolitical contests. These include the autonomous Xinjiang region
in China, Afghanistan and Pakistan in Central Asia, and a U.S. base in Cuba.
B. Transnational Influences in China, the United States, and Between the Two Countries
Transnational events and actors greatly influence why aliens are excluded
from legal protections, discrimination clouds detentions policies, and culture and
economics motivate a War on Terror. In order to explore the context wherein law
applies to these three issues, this subsection identifies the transnational forces
influential for Uighur detentions on Guantánamo. This nonlegal picture helps
explain why the law excludes aliens from legal protections.275 These identifications
are brief and focused on providing a big-picture and diverse view of the
transnational phenomena of Uighur detention.
The motivations for why Uighurs would emigrate from China point to
significant cultural and material contests. Their homeland and site of departure is
the autonomous region of Xinjiang in China. Uighur identity articulates an
ideological and cultural currency motivating separatism and consciousness that
crosses China’s political borders. This emanates from a region characterized by
highly volatile contests to secure resources and control of territory and
international borders. This region’s history includes the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, separatist tensions
in western China, and resource-rich and institutionally weak Central Asian
states.276
The departure context in China for Uighur detainees points to various
migration push-factors in terms of contested membership in China, state violence
and popular resistance, and a state increasing its control over its borders,
resources, and populations.277 Relevant to Kiyemba detainees, the context in China
includes: Uighur separatism; religious persecution by the Chinese government; a
historic quest for political control of Xinjiang, the western autonomous region
where Uighurs reside; increased economic exploitation of Xinjiang’s cotton,

275. See generally Preeti Bhattacharji, Uighurs and China’s Xinjiang Region, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS: BACKGROUNDER (July 6, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/china/uighurs-chinas-xinjiangregion/p16870; Chien-peng Chung, China’s “War on Terror”: September 11 and Uighur Separatism, 81
FOREIGN AFF. 8 (2002).
276. See generally Bhattachariji, supra note 275; Chung, supra note 275.
277. For descriptions of Uighurs, Uighur separatism, China’s persecution of them, and the
War on Terror, see Bhattacharji, supra note 275 and Chung, supra note 275.

Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete)

2012]

4/17/2012 1:22 PM

KIYEMBA, GUÁNTANAMO, AND IMMIGRATION LAW

241

natural gas, mineral resources, and oil; and volatile geopolitics just west of
Xinjiang. Xinjiang borders Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.278 To state that this is close to global geopolitical
contests is an understatement. Literally, various wars are to its west and the
militarily powerful and huge China is to its east. The China-Xinjiang relationship is
not entirely stable, with separatist violence threatening the recent Olympics and
Xinjiang achieving political independence from China twice last century.279
Domestically, the U.S. context points to similar cultural and material
struggles facilitating increased military involvement overseas, in this case in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The transnational pressure for increased foreign
presence is outward from the United States, but with important legal contests
domestically. The War on Terror represents ideological and material debates,
implicit in self-defense, eliminating security threats, a geopolitical fight for
resources and territory, and supporting governments in the region.280 Despite
dramatic events overseas, the War on Terror inserts itself domestically in a myriad
of political and legal debates. When the Kiyemba detainees were brought to the
base, they entered a hotbed of political and legal contests, developing since the
United States responded militarily to the September 11, 2001, attacks.281 On the
global stage, they represented efforts by China to convince the world of Uighur
terrorism’s link to Al Qaeda, and for the United States they represented a way to
gain China’s support in the War on Terror, which was especially needed in its early
stages.282 The resettlement of Uighur detainees created domestic political crises in
Bermuda, with these executive choices fueling larger political debates.283
At the U.S. base at Guantánamo, the Uighurs arrived in a context deeply
278. See Bhattacharji, supra note 275; Chung supra note 275, at 10–11.
279. See Bhattacharji supra note 275.
280. For descriptions of the interplay between domestic politics and ideology and the War on
Terror, see generally BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM, supra note 273, ANDREW J.
BACEVICH, THE LIMITS OF POWER: THE END OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (1st ed. 2008),
NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, MEETING THE ENEMY: AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), and Hernández-López, supra note 9; and Soederberg, supra note 267, at
165–66.
281. For descriptions of these legal and ideological debates fueling and responding to War on
Terror, see generally DAVID D. COLE, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE MEN AND IDEAS THAT SHAPED
AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR (2008), DAVID D. COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE
CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2006), and
DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON
TERROR (2007).
282. See Goldstein, supra note 107 (describing China’s attempt to present Uighur detainees as
reflecting Uighur terrorists); Louisa Lim, Tiny Island to Take 17 Guantanamo Detainees, NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO (June 10, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105188932
(arguing the Uighurs were detained to obtain China’s support in the War on Terror); Editorial, Pawns
in Guantanamo’s Game, BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 11, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/globe/
editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2007/03/11/pawns_in_guantanamos_game/.
283. See Wikileaks: Bermuda Sought Help on Crime, BERNEWS (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://bernews.com/2011/02/wikileaks-bermuda-sought-help-on-crime; Eckholm, supra note 107.
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divided about how to legally resolve foreign relations contests and interrelated
anxieties about foreigners, alien terrorist suspects, and the United States’ role as
sole superpower. This receiving-state context includes: the legal anomaly intrinsic
to the base’s extraterritorial authority; separation of powers contests implicit in
limiting judicial review; a divided electorate and political branches concerning
foreign relations and especially regarding the need for and legality of Guantánamo
detentions; antimigrant politics in response to immigrants who are mostly nonEuropean (i.e., not white); foreign relations often shaped by exceptionalism and
unilateralism, despite international critiques of this; and repeated military presence,
or the threat of such presence, in states populated primarily by non-European
populations, specifically Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea and historically
with bases in over ninety-eight countries.284
Connecting the Uighur homeland and the United States are the transnational
forces of violence and military activity in Central Asia, drawing American attention
and consequently becoming part of domestic U.S. debates. Similarly, Uighur
separatism or claims to self-determination enter the U.S.-China relations dialogue.
Extremely relevant to Uighur detentions, China and the United States both exert
diplomatic influence which cannot be ignored, and neither state’s will is easily
imposed on the other. This means that China is able to deter other nations from
resettling the Uighur-detainees and China will detain them if they are returned.
The United States succeeds in not admitting them or returning them to China. All
the while, a diplomacy and policy stalemate keeps five men trapped on
Guantánamo. These developments remain highly secretive and unknown at this
time, as suggested by U.S. State Department communiqués from WikiLeaks and
the Government’s position on keeping detainee information secret in Kiyemba I, II,
and III.285
The context connecting Uighur-departure and U.S.-reception includes: the
Kiyemba detainees traveling to Pakistan and/or Afghanistan; the Al-Qaeda training
center of Tora Bora in Afghanistan, where international terrorists migrated; civil
war and military intervention in Afghanistan; fluid political borders in Central
Asia; terrorist groups and counterterrorism efforts in Central Asia; a decade-long
War on Terror without clearly defined enemies, objectives, or duration; the United
States’ active role in Central Asian and Middle Eastern geopolitics; a resource war
for energy supplies and their markets in these regions with the United States as the
superpower and largest consumer; simultaneous diplomatic rivalry and
cooperation between the United States and China; and extraterritorial detentions
and interrogations programs.
In summation, the transnational context for Uighur detention suggests a

284. For the number of U.S. bases overseas, see generally CHRIS BEST & DAVID VINE,
ISLAND OF SHAME: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE U.S. MILITARY BASE ON DIEGO GARCIA (2009).
285. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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common discourse in the United States, China, and Central Asia. This includes:
limited legal protections for individuals, unchecked state power, foreign relations
influencing what individual rights are protected, and military action responding to
domestic and geopolitical pressures. Uighur detainees on Guantánamo may
represent a new class of stateless persons, detained and excluded by the United
States, persecuted by China, and unwelcomed by third states. For them indefinite
detention may amount to the role expulsion historically played for stateless
populations such as Jews, Roma (Gypsies), Palestinians, and Native Americans.286
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article raises two significant points about how immigration law has
been central to justifications to keep five noncombatant men detained indefinitely
at Guantánamo, despite their approved writ of habeas corpus in 2008. First, the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has relied on immigration law, mostly in the
form of the plenary powers doctrine, to justify these detentions.287 Even though
the Kiyemba triumvirate raised significant constitutional issues regarding habeas
remedies, they “fall back” on immigration law to continue detentions. The
Supreme Court has effectively agreed with these interpretations by not granting
certiorari review.
This reliance on plenary powers is especially important because the Supreme
Court held, in Boumediene, that detainees on Guantánamo enjoy constitutional
habeas rights. These rights are not barred by alien status or presence outside
domestic borders. The Kiyemba cases may be inconsistent with these extraterritorial
constitutional guarantees if the goal of Boumediene was to secure habeas release.288
The Kiyemba cases suggest that after aliens gain access to significant constitutional
rights, courts return to exclusionary immigration law norms, mostly within the
plenary powers doctrine.
Second, understanding the nonlegal context of Uighur detentions helps
explain why the current impasse exists.289 Although the Kiyemba quagmire appears
as “habeas remedies versus constitutional habeas rights” or “plenary power
286. For a discussion of stateless populations as citizenship’s other, see Kerber, supra note
245, at 7, 17, 28.
287. See discussion supra Parts II.A (examining Boumediene’s extraterritorial habeas protections
for alien detainees on the base); II.B.i–ii (analyzing Kiyemba I and III, habeas release, and the plenary
power doctrine); and II.B.iii (describing Kiyemba II, notice of habeas transfer, and the plenary power
doctrine).
288. See Kiyemba III Petition, supra note 4, at 2–3 (presenting the Court of Appeal holding as in
“direct conflict” with Boumediene, since it requires judicial relief of release, and the detainees are now
only left with political relief).
289. See discussion supra Parts III (describing transnational analysis of migration); II.A
(presenting critical theory on alienage and detention laws, de facto discrimination based on detainee
nationalities, and the cultural and economic motives for U.S. foreign policies including the War on
Terror); and III.B (applying a transnational migration analysis to Uighur detentions and U.S. and
China’s motivations).
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exclusions versus an extraterritorial Constitution,” the lack of a political resolution
may be the most significant force in continuing the detentions. The plenary
powers doctrine effectively bars judicial review so the political branches can
resolve these issues (i.e., to release, relocate, or detain the Uighurs). The Kiyemba
triumvirate squarely places the fate of the Uighurs within the authority of the
political branches. As interpreted by the Court of Appeals, immigration law
doctrine facilitates detention, but it does not propose or provide any remedy to
end detention that is not political. In fact, it quickly discounts the executive’s
power to parole aliens into the United States, which would end Uighur detention
and avoid the separation of powers issues implicit in habeas release or
immigration entry. Parole is a remedy with substantial legal force and historical
practice, crafted specifically for these kinds of situations. Otherwise foreign
relations, exercised by the executive and Congress, or other legislative remedies
could stop this detention impasse. These solutions are extremely unlikely given the
developments since 2008. Political options seem increasingly difficult to reach
between Congress, U.S. diplomats, China, third states, and the detainees.
This doctrinal quagmire, wherein law is unable to end illegal detention,
inspires asking what assumptions led to this. Critical legal theory shows that the
law applied to Guantánamo results in insider/outsider dynamics of alienage and
de facto discrimination based on the nationalities of detainees. It also highlights
how the War on Terror’s cultural and geopolitical assumptions facilitate Uighur
detention on Guantánamo.
To make sense of this from a transnational perspective, the Article explores
what motivates these legal assumptions and the positions of China, the United
States, and Uighur detainees. This is done with a transnational focus on Uighur
departure from China, receipt under U.S. authority, and the War on Terror’s cross
border influence. Studying these sending, receiving, and transnational contexts, the
law’s weakness stands out because a political resolution for Uighur detention
seems highly unlikely to resolve these contests.
Assumptions about diplomacy, culture, geopolitics, individual rights, and the
War on Terror frame how the law approaches Guantánamo. In particular, the
Uighurs migrated (at times freely and other times forcibly) to a series of extremely
contested locations, specifically Xinjiang, China, eastern Afghanistan, northwest
Pakistan, and the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. At each of these
locations there are limited checks on state power, a strong foreign relations
influence on the protection of individual rights and military action in response to
domestic and geopolitical needs. Habeas corpus guarantees and the plenary
powers doctrine appear as small domestic instruments in larger conflicts on a
global stage. These include the cultural, economic, and political contests occurring
in the War on Terror, geopolitics in Central Asia, violent popular movements, and
China’s westward expansion. This transnational analysis illuminates why “aliens
detained overseas” are excluded from significant legal protections. Associations
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with sending, receiving, and transnational controversies explain what motivates
legal exclusions for these aliens. The significance of transnational politics on
overseas detention law has become increasingly apparent with President Obama’s
executive Order regarding other Guantánamo detainees.290
Immigration law plays a vital role in keeping Uighurs detained in
Guantánamo despite significant constitutional rights affirmed in Boumediene and by
a district court. The Kiyemba cases illustrate how adaptable and powerful the
plenary powers doctrine is. They suggest that an extraterritorial Constitution with
habeas rights for aliens overseas must confront entrenched exclusionary
reasoning, benefiting from judicial precedent since the Chinese Exclusion Case. A
transnational analysis of the Uighurs, the War on Terror, China, and American
assumptions suggest why plenary power succeeds in keeping these men detained
with no end in sight. These two points shed light on how powerful immigration
law doctrine can be in sanctioning the indefinite detention of noncombatants.
They illuminate how a “Persistent Puzzle in Immigration” builds on a legal history
of exclusion entrenched in precedent and that a critical nonlegal context benefits
from these exclusions. The Kiyemba cases show that immigration law sees these
detentions as legal. Contemplating a release for the five Uighurs, Yusef Abbas,
Hajiakbar Abdulghupur, Saidullah Khalik, Ahmed Mohamed, and Abdul Razak,
inspires asking: why are they detained?

290. To understand the Obama Administration’s current approach to Guantánamo detentions
see Exec. Order No. 13,567, 70 Fed. Reg. 13277 (Mar. 7, 2011), addressing indefinite detention, an
inability to transfer detainees, and the influence of domestic and Congressional politics. See also White
House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantánamo and Detainee Policy
(Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07 /fact-sheet-new-actionsguant-namo-and-detainee-policy. The Executive Order implicitly acknowledges that for some
detainees, predicted to be nearly fifty of the 172 remaining, detentions may be indefinite. It
emphasizes that until now it has been near impossible to transfer many detainees from Guantánamo.
The Administration explicitly states that Congress has stifled the executive’s ability to prosecute
detainees. Because the Executive Order does not focus on detainees with habeas approved, it does
not directly impact the Uighurs. It focuses mostly on detainees who have had their habeas petitions
denied, will be tried by military commissions, or may be transferred from the base but without a
habeas release order from a court. The Executive Order creates a long-term system of review for
detainees who are not released or have yet to be tried in the revived military commissions or in
domestic courts. See Editorial, The Prison That Won’t Go Away, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/09/opinion/09wed2.html?_r=2&ref=opinion&adxnnlx=12996
72090-BnZtNbKyTjS8G6ymtnGzVg&pagewanted=print; see also Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut,
Obama Allows Indefinite Detention, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2011, at A1 (discussing the Executive Order
authorizing the continuation of indefinite Guantánamo detentions).
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